University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2017

Chevron's Interstitial Steps
Cary Coglianese
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legislation Commons, Public
Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Repository Citation
Coglianese, Cary, "Chevron's Interstitial Steps" (2017). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1948.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1948

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-5\GWN501.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

9-NOV-17

11:42

FOREWORD

Chevron’s Interstitial Steps
Cary Coglianese*
ABSTRACT
The Chevron doctrine’s apparent simplicity has long captivated judges,
lawyers, and scholars. According to the standard formulation, Chevron involves just two straightforward steps: (1) Is a statute clear? (2) If not, is the
agency’s interpretation of the statute reasonable? Despite the influence of this
two-step framework, Chevron has come under fire in recent years. Some critics bemoan what they perceive as the Supreme Court’s incoherent application
of the Chevron framework over time. Others argue that Chevron’s second
step, which calls for courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory provisions, amounts to an abdication of judicial responsibility. Yet as this Foreword shows, both criticisms draw on a mistaken understanding of Chevron. Despite the conventional view that Chevron analysis
has only two steps, the reality is that it has always comprised a series of steps
constituting a veritable Chevron staircase. If a statute is unclear at Step 1, a
court must confront a number of important legal questions—Chevron’s “Interstitial Steps”—before considering deference at Step 2. After all, the legal
justification for Chevron deference—legislative delegation of authority to the
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editors at The George Washington Law Review for their invitation to contribute this Foreword,
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Ryan Doerfler, Gabriel Scheffler, Daniel Walters, and David Zaring. In addition, Nicholas Bellos, Kelly Funderburk, Chelsey Hanson, and Adeline Rolnick provided research assistance and
Mitchell McDonald, Michelle Ramus, Richard Rothman, and Stephen Shapiro of The George
Washington Law Review provided much-appreciated editorial assistance.
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agency to resolve statutory ambiguity—requires judicial analysis of whether
the statute can properly be construed as having made such a delegation. Recognizing the Interstitial Steps embedded in Chevron analysis not only reveals
that the Supreme Court has been more consistent in its application of the
framework than is generally acknowledged, but such recognition also rebuts
the mistaken notion that Chevron automatically requires judicial deference on
the mere showing of statutory ambiguity. The full Chevron staircase—Step 1,
Interstitial Steps, and Step 2—reveals how much work Chevron demands of
judges and it makes clear that, far from abdicating their responsibility, judges
actually fulfill their duty to uphold the law when they defer to agency interpretations at Step 2. The staircase also affords a basis for seeing why a popular
alternative Chevron “Step 0” framework is misplaced and why, contrary to yet
another scholarly account, the Chevron doctrine cannot be meaningfully collapsed into a single step. Properly understood, the Chevron doctrine, with its
Interstitial Steps, ensures that courts act responsibly by answering crucial legal
questions at every step of the way.
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INTRODUCTION
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1
holds a position of unmistakable centrality in administrative law. Having inspired a vast number of judicial opinions and scholarly writings,2
today the decision finds itself at the center of an intensive debate over
its legitimacy and even its continued existence.3 The Chevron decision
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Scholars characterize Chevron as “foundational” or “landmark.” See, e.g., Thomas W.
Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW STORIES 398, 398 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA.
L. REV. 187, 188 (2006).
3 Some scholars have even pronounced the “death” or “demise” of Chevron. See, e.g.,
Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (2015);
Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L.
REV. 725, 729–30 (2007). In Congress, legislation purporting to extinguish the Chevron doctrine
has been passed by the House and could very well become law. See Regulatory Accountability
Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Orrin G. Hatch, The Proposed Separation of
Powers Restoration Act: Making Agencies Accountable, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2016,
1
2

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
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has assumed its salient position in contemporary policy and legal deliberations because it touches the rawest of administrative law’s
nerves. Its underlying aspiration is essentially administrative law’s aspiration: to constrain agency discretion within the bounds of the law.
By focusing on the interpretation of statutory language governing
and authorizing administrative action, Chevron seeks to strike a balance or demarcation of roles between the judiciary, with its responsibility for determining the meaning of legislation, and the agency, with
its authority and responsibility to implement legislation.4 To Chevron’s
critics, the decision—or at least its application by the courts—strikes
very much the wrong balance by purportedly abdicating the judiciary’s
responsibility to define the boundaries within which agency decisions
must remain in order to respect the principle of government under
law.5 Such charges are serious, even if they ultimately prove unpersuasive, but their intensity serves if nothing else to reinforce what it is
that has made Chevron so fascinating for so long: its centrality to administrative law’s core concern about constraining agency discretion.
Chevron has no doubt also captivated scholars, judges, and lawyers in part due to its beguiling simplicity. In an altogether complex,
dynamic, and varied field of law (which administrative law clearly is),
Chevron came along and held out hope for clarity and elegance,
promising to fulfill administrative law’s core purpose in two seemingly
straightforward steps. Step 1 asks merely if a statute’s meaning is
clear; if it is not, Step 2 asks if the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.6 What could be more alluring than two steps that
at 4, 4 (describing the Separation of Powers Restoration Act, sponsored by Senator Hatch, which
has been folded into the Regulatory Accountability Act introduced in the 115th Congress).
4 Herz, supra note 3, at 1909 (viewing Chevron as centrally concerned with the proper
“allocation” of power between the branches of government). Moreover, even though courts and
scholars alike routinely refer to “agency interpretations” of statutes—as do I in this Foreword—
such references do not imply that agencies are acting in a judicial capacity when they are construing ambiguous statutory provisions. What agencies do when construing statutes they have
been charged with implementing can be properly characterized as executive.
5 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “Chevron deference raises serious separation-of-powers questions” and suggesting that
it is “potentially unconstitutional”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that under Chevron, “courts are not fulfilling their duty
to interpret the law and declare invalid agency actions inconsistent with those interpretations”);
RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 217–18 (2016); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 12–13 (2014); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 788
(2010).
6 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

R
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can be articulated so succinctly?7 In a fanciful world, if Supreme Court
opinions were advertised to lawyers on late-night infomercials along
with the likes of kitchen gadgets and house-cleaning miracles, Chevron would be ready made for a high-pressured sales pitch: “It resolves
important administrative law questions in just two easy steps! That’s
right, just two steps!”
Despite their allure, Chevron’s two steps have never been easy
ones.8 Under Step 1, determining whether a statute speaks clearly to
the issue at hand calls for, according to Chevron itself, the use of the
“traditional tools of statutory construction.”9 What constitutes an appropriate tool of construction can be open to debate.10 The application
of these tools in specific instances will often be contested11 and metrics
for assessing statutory clarity are not widely shared.12 When judges do
find a statute sufficiently ambiguous at Step 1, they then move along a
path to Step 2, where the test of “reasonableness,” while deferential,
is still far from precise or self-evident.
The application of Chevron’s two steps to particular cases has
thus proven anything but simple. This Foreword emphasizes another
consideration that makes legal analysis under Chevron less simple
than it might have once seemed: the Chevron framework involves
more than just two steps. Supreme Court decisions have variously applied and extended Chevron—and at times even appeared to ignore
it—with the effect that what constitutes Chevron analysis demands
more than Step 1 and Step 2. Some commentators have already
7 See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1253, 1253, 1258 (1997) (noting the “allure of Chevron” and its “single unifying framework for review of agencies’ statutory interpretations”).
8 Just a few years after the Court decided Chevron, Clark Byse recognized that “the
Chevron model may not be as simple to administer as its literal terms suggest.” Clark Byse,
Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two,
2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 266 (1988).
9

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.

See generally, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERLEGAL TEXTS (2012); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a CivilLaw System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997).
10

PRETATION OF

11 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950) (arraying
pairs of canons in which one canon operates in a manner completely opposite of the other
canon).
12 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118,
2118–19, 2121, 2134–44 (2016) (book review).
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claimed that Chevron and its progeny actually call for three steps, with
a Step 0 preceding the standard two.13 Moving in the opposite direction, though, other scholars have urged that, despite the Supreme
Court’s invocation of two main steps, in actuality, Chevron only contains one step: a test of reasonableness.14 The lack of clarity or agreement today even over the number of steps required by Chevron may
explain why still other scholars have forecasted—if not already declared—Chevron’s “death.”15
What seems most clearly to have died, of course, is any illusion of
doctrinal simplicity that Chevron’s two basic steps might have promised.16 That illusion, though, should never have come to life in the first
place. Statutory interpretation, especially in cases involving administrative discretion in construing legislation, has never been straightforward, and nothing in Chevron could ever have made it so.17 We should
only be shocked at the supposed demise of Chevron in the way that
Captain Renault was shocked to hear of gambling in Casablanca.18
Despite the evident loss of Chevron’s once-promising allure of
simplicity, the opinion’s basic framework remains, for now, doctrinally
intact as a way of defining the strategy courts use when reviewing
agency decisions about statutory meaning. At a broad level of generality, something like the two-step framework may always exist, even if
relabeled or disavowed.19 This is because, for as long as Congress continues to give agencies discretion in how they administer statutes, and
as long as courts continue to review agency actions for compliance
with law, judges will continue to confront the same questions
presented by Chevron’s two steps: To what extent does a statute constrain agency discretion? To what extent has the statute delegated implementing authority, including a kind of interpretive authority, to the
agency? These questions are by no means exhaustive, and judges’
13 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 873–89 (2001); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 207–31.
14 See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
VA. L. REV. 597, 597–98 (2009); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 138
(2010).
15 See supra note 3.
16 See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 190.
17 Cf. Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 1559, 1567 (2010) (noting that “neither in theory nor in fact do alternative methods of
statutory interpretation, by themselves, decide most cases of any difficulty”).
18 See CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
19 See Kristin E. Hickman & Nicholas R. Bednar, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1392, 1398 (2017) (“Chevron deference, or something much like it, is a necessary consequence of and corollary to Congress’s longstanding habit of relying on agencies . . . .”).

R

R
R
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tasks in reviewing agency implementation of statutes have never been
confined to any tidy set of steps; but Chevron’s two fundamental steps
do serve as bookends demarcating administrative law’s core subject
matter: law and discretion. Step 1 cannot disappear under the rule of
law, for clear legislative meaning will always make unlawful any
agency action that conflicts with that meaning. Step 2 will also remain,
in some form or another, because the law’s meaning is not always
clear. As long as statutes contain broad and ambiguous language,
agency discretion will necessarily continue to exist and courts will continue to grapple with when and how to respect agencies’ delegated
authority by allowing them to exercise reasonable statutory
discretion.20
Chevron’s centrality to administrative law presumably helps explain the emerging criticism of its deference principle. What is needed
to assess this criticism, though, is greater clarity about the Chevron
framework. What merits highlighting most are the doctrinal interstices
between Chevron’s two famous steps: the lesser-known steps that
must be traveled before courts conclude, at Step 2, that they must
defer to agencies’ reasonable exercise of their authorized interpretive
discretion.21 Recognition of these intervening steps runs contrary to a
prevailing view among scholars that inserts a Step 0 prior to Chevron’s
two-step analysis.22 But as I explain in this Foreword, Step 1 always
begins the analysis, demarcating the ground floor in the doctrinal edifice the Court has constructed. Before judges can reach the second
floor, where Chevron deference takes hold, they must ascend a stair20 For this reason, some observers have suggested that critics of Chevron have really hidden in their objections to Chevron still larger concerns about delegation to administrative agencies. See Emily Bazelon & Eric Posner, The Government Gorsuch Wants to Undo, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/sunday-review/the-government-gorsuchwants-to-undo.html.
21 This Foreword is certainly not the first to suggest multiple steps, nor even necessarily
intervening ones. See, e.g., Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of
Agency Discretion: Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1, 33–50 (2011) (renumbering Chevron analysis into three main steps with substeps); Daniel J.
Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 760–61
(2017) (discussing D.C. Circuit decisions that reveal an expectation that agencies assert statutory
ambiguity in order to receive Chevron deference); Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of
Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 537–39 (2014) (stating that “the Mead steps can arise either as
a Step Zero or as a Step One-and-a-Half,” and then presenting a model with four steps: two
Mead steps, followed by the traditional two Chevron steps). However, this Foreword presents a
structure to Chevron analysis that departs in significant ways from these other formulations and
it offers an extended account of the doctrinal virtues—indeed the necessity—of Chevron’s Interstitial Steps.
22

See infra Part III for discussion of the so-called Step 0 analysis and why it is misplaced.
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case comprising several further steps of structured inquiry. The accretion of steps between Step 1 and Step 2 has, without a doubt, made
the Chevron doctrine appear less simple than it might have once
seemed, but acknowledging what I will refer to as Chevron’s Interstitial Steps makes the deference called for at Step 2 more understandable and even more defensible.
The remainder of this Foreword proceeds by first presenting the
Chevron framework, focusing on principal aspects of Supreme Court
doctrine that make Chevron Steps 1 and 2 the first and last steps on a
staircase, with necessary Interstitial Steps in between. My purpose in
Part I is to show that the prevailing legal justification for Chevron
deference at Step 2 depends on courts ascending several additional
steps after Step 1.23 These Interstitial Steps that follow Step 1 speak to
whether a court should make a legal determination that Congress has
explicitly or implicitly granted the agency the authority to define ambiguous statutory terms. Part II then maps out more concretely what
these Interstitial Steps entail and how they interact with each other,
presenting the conceptual order that follows from Chevron and its
progeny.
Judges and scholars have characterized the last several decades’
worth of Chevron developments as “muddled” and as having caused
“protracted confusion,”24 but I show that the Court’s prevailing Chevron analysis, when it is understood to include the Interstitial Steps,
does have a clear structure to it, one that is designed to justify the
ascent to deference. I also explain the advantages the Interstitial Steps
model holds over alternative doctrinal frameworks that scholars have
offered. Part III shows why Step 0 is misplaced. In Part IV, I explain
why efforts to collapse Chevron’s two main steps into a single one are
misguided. Unlike these alternatives, not only does a framework with
Interstitial Steps bookended by distinct Steps 1 and 2 fit the legal rationale the Supreme Court has articulated for Chevron deference, but

23 I certainly do not claim in this Foreword to offer a fully comprehensive treatment of all
the academic commentary or judicial developments that have surrounded Chevron over the last
several decades. Furthermore, I make no claims to articulate an empirical framework for how
judges actually go about deciding cases involving issues of agencies’ statutory interpretations,
nor to evaluate consequentialist claims about the institutional virtues of Chevron, vis-à-vis alternative institutional norms. Rather, my aim is to offer conceptual clarity, from an internal perspective, to prevailing Chevron doctrine and its legal justification.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 245 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1443, 1475 (2005).
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this framework also blunts the normative criticism that scholars and
judges have leveled at Chevron.
I. THE CHEVRON STAIRCASE
Chevron’s conceptual framework begins with a first step that
should be neither controversial nor very confusing. If the law is clear,
then that truly is “the end of the matter,” and courts as well as agencies must conform to the law.25 Determining whether the law clearly
addresses the matter at hand is the responsibility of a court, using
traditional methods of statutory interpretation.26 Only if a court finds
that the statute does not squarely resolve the question at hand should
it proceed up the staircase toward Step 2.27 To appreciate why the Supreme Court has insisted on additional steps between Step 1 and Step
2—the Interstitial Steps outlined below—it is important to keep in
mind what Step 2 entails. It may seem obvious but it bears noting that
Step 2 is what distinguishes and defines Chevron “deference.”28 In
contrast to Step 1, where the courts make the authoritative determination of a statute’s meaning, at Step 2 the agency has primary responsibility, subject to the longstanding constraint that agency actions are
reasonable.29 The judicial question at Step 2 becomes “whether the
Administrator’s view . . . is a reasonable one.”30 If it is, then the
agency’s view prevails.31 Courts have a duty to uphold all reasonable
agency constructions of relevant statutory provisions that are not
clearly specified.32
The controversy that Chevron has engendered over the years
stems from Step 2. Critics of Chevron ask why judges’ views about the
best meaning of an ambiguous statute must give way to the agency’s
views.33 After all, since at least Marbury v. Madison,34 the judiciary
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
Id. at 843 n.9.
27 See id. at 843.
28 See id. at 843, 845. Sometimes scholars and judges use the phrase “Chevron deference”
to describe the entire two-step framework—and even on occasion to refer to Step 1. See, e.g.,
Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34
(2017) (referring to “Chevron deference interpretations at step one”); see also infra notes
163–69.
29 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44.
30 Id. at 845.
31 Id. at 844.
32 See id. at 866.
33 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (worrying that Chevron doctrine “risks trampling the constitutional design by affording executive agencies license to overrule a judicial declaration of the law’s meaning prospectively, just as legislation might”); CSX Transp. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C.
25
26
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has claimed that it must serve as the final arbiter of the law’s meaning,35 a responsibility reinforced by section 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) which instructs that “court[s] shall decide all
relevant questions of law” and “interpret . . . statutory provisions.”36
Yet Chevron does not actually call for abdication of the judiciary’s
responsibility under section 706, as some have suggested,37 because, at
both steps in the Chevron framework, the judiciary is very much engaged in interpreting statutory provisions.38 At Step 1, judges determine the clear meaning of the statute and, at Step 2, they make pivotal
interpretive judgments about whether an agency’s view falls within a
reasonable range of constructions that an ambiguous statutory provision can support.39
Still, the role that courts perform at Step 2 is different than what
normally would apply outside of the administrative setting. Ordinarily, to decide a case when an agency is not in the picture, a court
would seek to give its own best interpretation of an ambiguous statute.40 But when an agency is involved and has construed an ambiguous
statute that it is charged with implementing, Chevron’s Step 2 tells the
court not to offer its best interpretation but instead to defer to the
agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable.41
The Chevron Court itself explained why courts must defer. When
an agency is involved, the role of the court typically needs to be more
circumscribed because Congress has either explicitly or implicitly delegated authority to the agency to fill the gaps that exist within a
statute:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.
Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (“The Chevron test is hard to square with the foregoing
traditional views of the court’s role in cases of statutory interpretation. . . . [I]t is the court, not
the agency, that should be responsible for construing congressional statutes.”).
34 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
35 Id. at 177.
36 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
37 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron
seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty.”); see also supra
note 5.
38 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
39 Id.
40 See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
41 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
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the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an
agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.42
These kinds of explicit or implicit delegations change the responsibility of a court compared with other cases not involving an agency, not
because of some extralegal judicial abdication but precisely out of full
respect for the law Congress has enacted.43
The legally altered responsibility of a court is easiest to see when
statutes explicitly delegate to an agency the authority to define broad
or ambiguous terms. For example, the Affordable Care Act44 requires
that health insurance plans provide for “essential health benefits,” but
leaves undefined what specific health benefits will count as “essential.”45 The power to define these terms is expressly delegated to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services: “the Secretary shall define
the essential health benefits,” subject to certain statutory constraints.46
Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act47 expressly states that financial-related
administrative agencies “shall jointly define the term ‘qualified residential mortgage’ for purposes of th[e] subsection” related to exemptions from credit risk retention regulation.48 These provisions from the
Dodd-Frank Act and the Affordable Care Act are but two examples
of a longstanding practice of express congressional delegation of authority to define ambiguous terms. Surely it cannot be an abdication
of judicial responsibility for the courts to defer in such instances to
reasonable interpretations that agencies give to these ambiguous stat42 Id. at 843–44 (footnote omitted); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (noting “the assumed delegation of ‘lawmaking’ discretion upon which Chevron rests”). It is true that, toward the end of its opinion in
Chevron, the Supreme Court also made note of agencies’ greater expertise and political accountability relative to judges. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. Such considerations, however, cannot
provide independent legal justifications for Chevron deference as much as they reinforce the
wisdom of judicial recognition in appropriate circumstances of an implicit delegation to “the
agency charged with the administration of the statute.” Id.
43 See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28
(1983) (“[I]t would be violating legislative supremacy by failing to defer to the interpretation of
an agency to the extent that the agency had been delegated law-making authority.”).
44 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012).
46 Id. § 18022(b)(1).
47 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
48 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(4)(B) (2012).
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utory terms. Quite the contrary, a court doing anything other than
deferring would be failing to honor the law itself, as these statutes
expressly give the agencies the responsibility to define pertinent statutory terms.
When a statute expressly delegates to an agency the authority to
define general or ambiguous terms, one of the Interstitial Steps that
makes up the Chevron staircase begins to emerge, as it becomes clear
that a court, in respecting the express delegation and using it as a reason to defer to the agency, entertains an intervening consideration between Step 1 and Step 2. That step may seem almost imperceptible,
but the Court’s opinion in Chevron noted how “an express delegation
of authority . . . to elucidate a specific provision of the statute” gives
rise to an obligation, at what is now known as Step 2, to give the
agency’s interpretation “controlling weight.”49
The Court further explained that such a delegation of interpretive
authority could also sometimes be implied.50 Any implied delegation,
though, depends on more than the mere existence of statutory ambiguity. Step 2 deference requires that a court also find that the agency
construing an ambiguous statutory provision has been “charged with
responsibility for administering the provision.”51 Proceeding to Step 2
is thus conditional not only on a finding that the statute is ambiguous
(Step 1), but also on a showing of an explicit or implicit congressional
delegation that the court is bound to honor.52 Had the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) never been “charged with responsibility
for administering the provision” at issue in Chevron, the Court would
surely not have viewed itself as being bound by that agency’s reasonable interpretation of the provision.53
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
Id.
51 Id. at 865; see also id. at 844–45 (describing as a “well-settled principle[]” that “considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme
it is entrusted to administer”); id. at 863 (emphasizing the importance of the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) being “the agency primarily responsible for administering this important legislation”).
52 Id. at 844–45.
53 The relative imperceptibility of the Interstitial Steps implicit in Chevron can sometimes
suggest that the mere existence of statutory ambiguity gives rise to Step 2 deference. For example, in Brand X, Justice Thomas’s majority opinion might seem to suggest that merely passing
over Step 1 impels the judge to ascend to Step 2: “In Chevron, this Court held that ambiguities in
statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency
to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). To the extent that passages like this one imply that Step
2 deference becomes automatic upon a finding of ambiguity, they are not a full and faithful
reading of Chevron, which does not indicate that the mere existence of an ambiguity by itself
49
50
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Chevron recognizes what even a cursory review of the U.S. Code
makes plain: Congress does not always make explicit and specific its
grant of gap-filling authority with respect to broad or ambiguous statutory terms. Many statutes contain ambiguous terms without containing accompanying provisions like the examples noted above in the
Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Act, which expressly grant
agencies authority to define specified terms. On occasion, legislation
grants agencies more general definitional authority. For example, the
Small Business Jobs Act54 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
“issue such regulations and other guidance as the Secretary determines necessary or appropriate to implement this chapter including to
define terms, to establish compliance and reporting requirements, and
such other terms and conditions necessary to carry out the purposes of
this chapter.”55 In another instance, the International Lending Supervision Act56 provides that “[t]he appropriate Federal banking agencies
are authorized to interpret and define the terms used in this chapter.”57
On still more occasions, statutes fail even to give express authorization to agencies to define terms. Nevertheless, they do frequently
empower agencies to issue regulations that are necessary to effectuate
the statutes they have been charged with administering. Examples are
legion, but just a few instances illustrate the type of general, “necessary-and-proper” authority that Congress routinely grants to agencies:
• “The [Securities and Exchange] Commission shall have the authority to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary
or appropriate to implement the provisions of this section consistent with the purposes of this section.”58
• “[T]he Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe all needful
rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, including
constitutes a delegation of gap-filling authority. If that were the case, the Chevron majority
would have never needed to distinguish between explicit and implicit delegations; every ambiguity would have been inherently a delegation. Importantly, even the quoted passage from Brand
X implies that more than just statutory ambiguity is needed, as it indicates that Step 2 deference
hinges on both a finding of statutory ambiguity and agency “jurisdiction” to administer the statute containing the ambiguous language. Id. The logic of the majority opinion in Chevron is clear:
the reason courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations at Step 2 is because of the
existence of some kind of express or implied delegation of authority—that is, the passage over
an intervening step or steps.
54 Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
55 12 U.S.C. § 5709 (2012) (emphasis added).
56 International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901–3911 (2012).
57 Id. § 3909(a)(1) (emphasis added).
58 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2012).
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all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any
alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.”59
• “The [Commodity Futures Trading] Commission shall have the
authority to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this section
consistent with the purposes of this section.”60
• “The Administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency]
is authorized to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to
carry out his functions under this chapter.”61
Although the Chevron opinion did not refer explicitly to a general
statutory delegation like one of these—the last of which is found in
the Clean Air Act,62 the statute at issue in Chevron—such language
giving agencies general authority to make binding rules provides a
sound basis for courts to imply a delegation to the agency to define
ambiguous or general terms.63 Chevron did, after all, emphasize the
“responsibility” Congress had given to the EPA to administer the
Clean Air Act.64 Chevron also expressly indicated that courts should
ask if they have before them just “such a case” of implied authority
before giving controlling weight to the agency’s reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions.65 Such conditional language
demarcates the existence of at least one step on the staircase between
Step 1 and Step 2.
In United States v. Mead Corp.,66 the Supreme Court confronted
an agency interpretation contained in informal ruling letters, and the
Court’s majority concluded that such letters provide an insufficient
basis upon which to grant Chevron deference.67 The majority emphasized Chevron’s intervening inquiry about an explicit or implicit delegation of authority to define ambiguous statutory terms with the
“force of law.”68 As indicated in Chevron, grants of explicit authority
to define general terms provide a plain justification for moving to Step
26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
7 U.S.C. § 26(i) (2012).
61 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1) (2012).
62 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).
63 See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 165 (2007) (treating a
general statutory grant of authority “to prescribe necessary rules, regulations, and orders” as
giving the agency “the power to fill . . . gaps” in “the scope and definition of statutory terms”).
64 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845–46 (1984) (quoting Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975)).
65 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
66 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
67 Id. at 234.
68 See id. at 226–31.
59
60
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2, but Mead reminded courts that Chevron also acknowledged that
Congress can implicitly delegate interpretive authority to agencies.69
For the Mead majority, “Chevron was simply a case recognizing that
even without express authority to fill a specific statutory gap, circumstances pointing to implicit congressional delegation present a particularly insistent call for deference.”70
Given that an inquiry into the agency’s administrative responsibility was baked into the Chevron Court’s opinion itself, Mead can
hardly be said to have made an “avulsive change” in the Chevron
framework, as Justice Scalia claimed in his Mead dissent.71 The Mead
opinion may well have generated some “confusion”72 for scholars and
even judges, as Scalia predicted, but it is difficult to see how it was
Mead, and not Chevron, that created what Scalia described as “a presumption that agency discretion does not exist unless the statute, expressly or impliedly, says so.”73 Contrary to Justice Scalia’s criticism,
the need for finding a statutory delegation followed from Chevron itself and its conditioning of the controlling weight of an agency’s reasonable interpretation on the existence of an express or implied
delegation to the agency—that is, on surmounting one or more steps
between Step 1 and Step 2.74
Mead merely attempted to add some clarity to those Interstitial
Steps. Whether it succeeded has been subject to debate. Still, the
Mead Court did articulate formal indicia for the conditions that give
rise to Step 2 deference, declaring that the express grant of either
rulemaking authority or formal adjudication authority provides “a
very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment.”75
Mead also generally required the agency to use its rulemaking or formal adjudication authority in order to make an interpretation of a
statute that would qualify for Chevron deference.76 All of this is actuId. at 227, 229, 237.
Id. at 237.
71 See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 245; see also Bressman, supra note 24, at 1445, 1475 (claiming “Mead has muddled” the Chevron doctrine); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 347, 355 (2003) (discussing the “confusion and error” created by Mead).
73 Mead, 533 U.S. at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74 See Alexander “Sasha” Volokh, The Shadow Debate over Private Nondelegation in
DOT v. Association of American Railroads, 2014–2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 359, 381 n.111
(“Deference to agencies has always been rooted in concepts of implicit delegation—Chevron
deference explicitly so.” (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843–44 (1984))).
75 Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
76 Id. at 226–27. Mead’s requirement that agencies actually use their rulemaking or adjudi69
70

R
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ally quite clear, making Mead an advance in doctrinal illumination because it specifies conditions under which courts can properly imply a
delegation of interpretive authority to the agency.77 The less-thanclear aspect of Mead lay in its statement that “other statutory circumstances” might also justify implying a delegation of authority for “the
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses
ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law.”78 Mead
gave little indication of what these other circumstances might be, with
the Court making a point to recognize that they will likely vary because statutes themselves vary.79 Despite the unresolved nature of
what other circumstances would justify reaching Step 2, Mead did clarify that, absent an express delegation of term-defining authority, the
judicial task before moving from Step 1 to Step 2 is to determine if
such a delegation should be implied.80
Justice Scalia favored simplicity. In his dissent in Mead, he
seemed to pine for earlier days when Chevron had just two steps
(even though, as indicated above, it never really did). For Justice
Scalia, if a statute proved ambiguous and incapable of resolving the
question at hand, then a court would simply defer to the reasonable
and authoritative interpretation an agency gives “to the statute it is
charged with enforcing.”81 In other words, Justice Scalia favored what
catory authority can be justified as the necessary effectuation or use of the authority that the
courts look to in order to imply a broader gap-filling authority. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v.
Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016). This requirement also seems to promote procedural regularity and circumspection, both of which are presumably desirable.
77 This does not mean Mead cannot be questioned for its seeming emphasis on procedural
formality as a basis for implying delegation. Nevertheless, the decision does have an internal
logic to it; namely, because courts must decide when to imply a delegation to an agency to
construe or define binding statutory language, it presumably will be easiest to do so when Congress has given the agency the power to make binding general decisions and the agency is exercising that power. It will presumably be more difficult for a court to imply a delegation of
interpretive authority in cases where agencies either have never been given authority to make
binding decisions or are not relying on that authority to define or construe the ambiguous
statute.
78

Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.

79

See id. at 236–37.

See id. at 229 (explaining that a court’s obligation to defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision depends on whether it is “apparent from the
agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the
statute or fills a space in the enacted law”); see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551
U.S. 158, 173 (2007) (stating that “the ultimate question is whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to treat an agency’s rule, regulation, application of a statute, or
other agency action as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of ‘gap-filling’ authority”).
80

81

Mead, 533 U.S. at 239–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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he described as a “general presumption of authority in agencies to
resolve ambiguity in the statutes they have been authorized to enforce.”82 This sounds simple—and it is simpler than what the majority
in Mead articulated—but, importantly, it too has embedded within it
an interstitial step. Even for Justice Scalia, clearance of Step 1 did not
automatically mean the agency should receive deference for its reasonable interpretation of the statute. On Justice Scalia’s account, only
a “general presumption” would favor getting from Step 1 to Step 283—
and a “presumption,” by definition, can be overcome by some other
circumstances. Much as with the majority in Mead, though, Justice
Scalia failed to make clear what these other circumstances might be.
In addition, even for Justice Scalia, judges first must ascertain whether
the statute the agency is construing is one that the agency has been
“authorized to enforce”—an intervening step that may seem altogether imperceptible because it will be satisfied in most cases, but nevertheless it does call for an inquiry that occupies a position between
Step 1 and Step 2.84 The existence of just such an intervening step
becomes clearer in disputes involving transgovernmental statutes,
such as the APA, Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),85 and National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).86 When the terms of
these transgovernmental statutes fail to speak precisely and clearly to
the question at hand, the existence of the intervening step inherent in
Justice Scalia’s precondition becomes apparent, and courts have refused to extend Chevron deference in these instances.87
The requirement that the agency must be charged with implementing the statute in question is among the several circumstances or
“indicators” that inform courts’ decisions about whether to ascend to
82

Id. at 239.

83

Id.

Id. Justice Scalia has also indicated that the agency’s interpretation must be “authoritative,” whereby it “represent[s] the official position of the expert agency,” interposing yet another
intervening step. Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 590–91, 590 n.* (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
84

85

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370m-12 (2012 &
Supp. III 2015).
86

87 See, e.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (refusing to defer
in a case involving the APA); Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1285 n.15 (1st Cir.
1996) (refusing to defer in a case involving NEPA); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing to defer in a case involving
FOIA). As Justice Scalia elsewhere noted, Chevron deference can only apply “if the matter at
issue is one for which the agency has responsibility”; it does not apply “to matters that are not
committed to the agency’s administration.” Scalia, supra note 42, at 519.

R
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the top of the Chevron staircase.88 It is surely not the only other indicator, though, because, as already noted, the majority in Mead recognizes “that different statutes present different reasons for considering
respect for the exercise of administrative authority or deference to
it.”89
The Court’s recognition of “different reasons” for determining
whether to apply Chevron deference helps explain yet another intervening step: the so-called “major question” or “extraordinary case”
exception.90 This step was evident in King v. Burwell,91 where the
Court faced the question of whether the Affordable Care Act’s provision for tax credits for insurance sold on exchanges “established by
the State” included exchanges created by the federal government.92
The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) said it did.93 The Court agreed,
but did so without giving Chevron deference to the IRS interpretation.94 In fact, the King Court’s treatment of Chevron was brief and far
from stepwise.95 The Court never addressed Step 1 directly, although
it could not have resolved the case as it did at Step 1, for no credible
claim could be made that exchanges “established by the State” unambiguously encompassed exchanges established by the federal government. The statute was, if anything, unambiguous in a direction
opposite of the Court’s conclusion.
Had the King Court openly grappled with Step 1, the best it
would have been able to muster was to conclude that the statute was
ambiguous, explaining why by reference to the same account it gave
for its ultimate judgment that “established by the State” encompasses
both state or federal governments.96 Then the Court could have
moved upward toward Step 2. If it had reached the top of the Chevron
staircase, all it would have needed to do was find that the IRS interpretation was reasonable to reach the same resolution it ultimately
reached, upholding the Obama Administration’s implementation of
See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231, 237.
Id. at 238.
90 See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 236–42, for background on the “major question”
exception.
91 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
92 Id. at 2487.
93 Id. at 2488.
94 Id. at 2488–90.
95 See id. at 2488–89.
96 For a discussion of why the Court could appropriately view such a statutory provision as
ambiguous, see Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2928333 (arguing that judges may be
justified in demanding greater evidence of statutory clarity in high-stakes cases).
88
89

R
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the Act. The Court’s very explanation for its own reading of the statute would have provided ample basis for concluding that the IRS interpretation was at least a reasonable one.97
The King Court, however, did not invoke Chevron deference—
that is, it did not reach the top of the staircase. Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion did acknowledge Chevron’s two steps:
When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute,
we often apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron. Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is
ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable. This approach “is premised on the theory that a
statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”98
But the Chief Justice did not find any implicit gap-filling delegation in
the Affordable Care Act with respect to the relevant statutory provision.99 The reason had nothing to do with the lack of rulemaking authority or its exercise, as articulated in Mead. Rather, the Chief Justice
pointed to FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,100 where the
Court stated that “[i]n extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit
delegation.”101 The Chief Justice in King v. Burwell continued:
This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the
Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending
each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep “economic and
political significance” that is central to this statutory scheme;
had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it
surely would have done so expressly. It is especially unlikely
that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS,
which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of
this sort.102

97 This was, incidentally, the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in the case below. King
v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 375–76 (4th Cir. 2014).
98 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488 (citations omitted) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
99

Id. at 2488–89.

100

529 U.S. 120 (2000).

101

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).

102

Id. at 2489 (citation omitted).
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The King Court concluded that “[t]his is not a case for the IRS. It is
instead our task to determine the correct reading of [the statute].”103
In this way, King made plain yet another Interstitial Step to be cleared
to reach Step 2. The Court showed the existence of, to borrow Mead’s
terms, one “other circumstance” that can make it implausible to think
that Congress ever intended to leave a particular statutory provision’s
meaning up to an agency, even in the face of statutory ambiguity.104
What is it exactly about “extraordinary circumstances” of the
kind in King that makes it so implausible to imply a delegation to the
agency? The reasons given by Chief Justice Roberts are not entirely
satisfying on their face. After all, courts assume responsibility when
confronted with questions of law, not ones of economics or politics.105
Questions of “deep ‘economic and political significance’”106 almost
axiomatically would seem better addressed by an administrative
agency with greater expertise and political accountability.107 Even admitting that the IRS “has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy,”108 as the King Court did, it is undoubtedly true that courts have
no such expertise either. Why, then, was this case so clearly one for
the court, and not the agency, to determine the meaning of the
statute?
The answer almost certainly lies not in the criteria embedded in
Chevron’s steps themselves, whether the terminal or intervening ones,
but rather in what follows from ascending, or not ascending, the staircase. If all the steps are cleared and a court reaches Step 2, then the
103

Id.

Some commentators have suggested that the majority in King simply bypassed Chevron
altogether, invoking Step 0. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, King v. Burwell:
What Does It Portend for Chevron’s Domain?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72, 75 (claiming that “in just a
few sentences, the majority dispensed with Chevron”); Michael Dorf, The Triumph of Chevron
Step Zero?, DORF ON LAW (July 27, 2015), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2015/07/the-triumph-ofchevron-step-zero.html (arguing that the majority opinion in King “offers a classic Chevron-stepzero account”). Yet, as explained further in Part III, the Court could not properly bypass Step 1;
no court can, ever. If a statute is unambiguous, neither a court nor an agency can lawfully disregard or bypass it. What the King Court bypassed was simply an explicit analysis labeled in Step 1
terms. The majority made it abundantly clear in its opinion that it rejected the view that exchanges “established by the State” in the statute unambiguously precluded exchanges established by the federal government. The Court concluded that the statute was ambiguous at Step 1
but that it could not reach Step 2 because of an Interstitial Step.
104

105 The Court has articulated a so-called political question doctrine that makes certain
claims nonjusticiable. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
106

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.

107

Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1609–10

(2016).
108

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
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agency’s reasonable interpretation will control. Placing control with
the agency also means, however, that the interpretation could change
over time, such as in a later administration.109 But when a court cannot
clear a step on the way to the top of the Chevron staircase, and thus
never reaches Step 2, the result is that the court is no longer dutybound to follow the agency’s reasonable interpretation. Instead, it can
decide for itself what the statute means, based on its best, all-thingsconsidered judgment. A court may still decide to take notice of the
agency’s interpretation, and it may even find itself persuaded by it—in
accord with noncontrolling Skidmore deference110—but ultimately the
court will make the final call, yielding an outcome that cannot be
changed by a subsequent administration.111
In King, the immediate outcome in the case did not turn on
whether the Court decided on its own or whether it accorded the
agency deference under either Skidmore or Chevron. The King majority and the agency agreed on how the relevant statutory provision
ought to have been construed.112 But whether the Court decided itself
or deferred to the agency mattered greatly in the longer term. When
the Court fails to reach the top of the Chevron staircase and therefore
decides for itself what a statute means,113 the Court’s interpretation
will have a strong stare decisis effect, fixing the meaning of the statute
unless or until Congress amends the legislation.114 By contrast, whenever any court reaches the top of the Chevron staircase and decides
the case at Step 2, the agency’s reasonable decision is one that the
courts must respect, but it need not control the agency in the future.
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 42, at 518–19.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
111 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)
(contrasting instances where “the agency remains the authoritative interpreter”—i.e., Step 2—
with those involving “agency interpretations to which Chevron [deference] is inapplicable,” and
explaining that only in the former cases does the agency have the authority to change its interpretation, within the bounds of reasonableness).
112 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
113 A court finds itself in this situation either when it determines that there is one clear
meaning to the statute—of the kind that Step 1 asks it to search for using all the traditional
statutory interpretation tools—or when the court gives a statute the best meaning it can because
of the failure to pass one of the Interstitial Steps.
114 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 984. Brand X does misleadingly state that a prior court’s
interpretation of a statute prevails over a later agency interpretation “only if the prior court
decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretion.” Id. at 982 (emphasis added). If the prior court also fails to
reach Step 2 because of one of Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, then its prior interpretation would
also constrain the agency for the same reasons underlying the treatment the Brand X Court gives
to judicial decisions resolved at Step 1: a court in such instances has no justification to defer to an
agency’s interpretation.
109

R

110

R
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Rather than being fixed, the meaning an agency properly gives to a
statutory provision will be susceptible to change, especially in any new
administration. As Chevron made clear, “[a]n initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.”115
The upshot is that, in King, had the Supreme Court not stopped
in the middle of the staircase, and had it instead proceeded to Step 2
and awarded Chevron deference to the IRS, a new administration
would only have had to reopen the matter and issue a new rule construing exchanges “established by the State” to mean just what those
words say: only exchanges established by state governments.116 Presumably that would have been a reasonable statutory interpretation,
given its literal alignment with the statute’s text.117 The practical result, of course, would have been to undermine the larger purpose of
the Affordable Care Act, imposing consequences of “deep economic
and political significance”—a result that, once contemplated, made it
extremely difficult to justify implying that Congress delegated to the
agency to make (and potentially change) any such determination
about the meaning of the pivotal language “established by the
State.”118
When an interpretive question raises extremely consequential
stakes, like those implicated in King, it becomes untenable to conclude that Congress meant to delegate to the agency the authority to
determine, and then possibly to change at a later date, the statute’s
meaning. Rather than casting doubt on Chevron, the King decision
actually reaffirms Chevron’s core structure: Step 1, followed by Interstitial Steps needed to justify an implied delegation to the agency, followed by Step 2.
II. MAPPING CHEVRON’S INTERSTITIAL STEPS
From its very origins, the Chevron Court’s reasoning anticipated
the need for courts to encounter steps that lie between the finding of
statutory ambiguity and the granting of controlling weight to an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.119 The Chevron
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984).
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2490 (2015).
117 See id. at 2490.
118 Id. at 2488–89. Kristin Hickman helpfully indicates that the extraordinary stakes involved in King may also have led to the muting of any differences over how the Court handled
Chevron in this case, and she suggests that King may well “fade into obscurity as doctrinally
insignificant with respect to Chevron’s scope.” Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended
Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 66.
119 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
115
116
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Court did not fully explicate the express or implied delegation given
to the EPA, presumably because the Interstitial Steps in that case
were so effortless to ascend; however, the Court did repeatedly stress
the delegated power that the EPA possessed:
• “[T]he listing of overlapping, illustrative terms [in the statute] was intended to enlarge, rather than to confine, the
scope of the agency’s power to regulate particular sources
in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.”120
• “[T]he agency [is] primarily responsible for administering
this important legislation . . . .”121
• Deference is owed to “an agency to which Congress has
delegated policymaking responsibilities.”122
The Court’s justification for holding itself duty-bound to follow the
EPA’s reasonable interpretation of “source” in the Clean Air Act centered squarely on a recognition of a legislative delegation of definitional authority.123 That justification, by its very nature, necessitates
the passage over some intervening steps between Step 1 and Step 2.
As we have seen, post-Chevron decisions, including Mead and
King, have marked out these intervening steps more distinctly.124 It is
now possible to summarize a series of key questions that courts need
to confront before concluding they are duty-bound to defer to the
agency’s reasonable definition of an ambiguous statute: Does the legislation contain an express delegation of gap-filling authority? Does
the legislation implicitly delegate gap-filling authority, such as by authorizing the agency to engage in rulemaking or formal adjudication?
If so, has the agency used that rulemaking or adjudication authority in
pronouncing its interpretation of the statute? Do other circumstances
indicate that Congress did or did not intend the agency to have gapfilling authority? For example, does the statute apply across the federal government or is it one for which the agency making an interpretation has been specifically charged with the responsibility for
implementing? Do extraordinary economic or political implications
follow from the resolution of the statutory ambiguity, such that it is
implausible to conclude that Congress intended the agency to resolve
the issue?
120

Id. at 862.

121

Id. at 863.

122

Id. at 865–66.

123

See id. at 860–62.

124

See supra Part I.
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These questions represent additional but necessary conditions
that must be satisfied for a court to determine that Congress explicitly
or implicitly delegated the agency primary authority to define ambiguous statutory terms, and thus for a court to award deference at Step 2.
These additional conditions constitute Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, ordered in the following decision-tree fashion to reveal the coherent
structure reflected in Chevron jurisprudence:
Step 1: Are the pertinent statutory provisions clear?125
Yes: The court must apply, and the agency must conform to, the meaning of the statute. Analysis concludes and stare decisis adheres.
No: Move to next step.
Step 1.1: Did Congress expressly delegate gap-filling authority to the agency?126
Yes: Proceed directly to Step 2.
No: Move to next step.
Step 1.2: Is the ambiguous statutory provision at issue so
vital to major economic or political issues, or does it present
other extraordinary circumstances, such that it is implausible
that Congress would have wanted an agency to determine
(and thus also potentially to change) the meaning of the
provision?127
Yes: The court decides. Skidmore deference may still
be afforded. Analysis concludes and stare decisis
adheres.
No: Move to next step.
Step 1.3: Has Congress given the agency authority to engage
in rulemaking or formal adjudication?128
Yes: Move to next step.
No: Proceed directly to Step 1.5.
125 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. Daniel Hemel and Aaron Nielson call
attention to D.C. Circuit Court decisions that purport to require agencies to have expressly asserted that the answer to this question is “no” in order to advance toward Step 2. Hemel &
Nielson, supra note 21, at 760. Although such an additional step is not compelled by Chevron, I
acknowledge the possibility of the Supreme Court in the future accepting an additional step or
steps to the structure presented here. I limit this structure to salient questions presented to date
by the Court.
126 See supra notes 42–43, 49–52 and accompanying text. This step only asks about an express delegation of interpretive authority to an agency because Steps 1.2 to 1.6 provide the
framework for a court to determine whether it would be justified in implying such a delegation.

R

R

R

127

See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.

R

128

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.

R
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Step 1.4: Did the agency’s interpretation stem from its proper use
of its authority to engage in rulemaking or formal adjudication?129
Yes: Proceed directly to Step 1.6.
No: Move to next step.
Step 1.5: Do other circumstances indicate that Congress intended
the agency to fill gaps in ambiguous statutory provisions?130
Yes: Proceed directly to Step 2.
No: The court decides. Skidmore deference may still be afforded. Analysis concludes and stare decisis adheres.
Step 1.6: Do other circumstances indicate that Congress intended
for the courts rather than the agency to fill gaps in ambiguous
statutory provisions (such as with transgovernmental statutes)?131
Yes: The court decides. Skidmore deference may still be afforded. Analysis concludes and stare decisis adheres.
No: Move to next step.
Step 2: Is the agency’s interpretation reasonable?132
Yes: The court must uphold the agency’s interpretation,
even if it is not the same as the interpretation the
court would have made. The agency is free to change
its interpretation later to another reasonable
interpretation.
No: The court remands to the agency. The agency may
seek to make another interpretation that falls within
the zone of reasonableness.
Figure 1 graphically represents these various steps.
For some lawyers, judges, and scholars, enumerating Chevron’s
Interstitial Steps in such a comprehensive fashion may well serve to
increase their overall anxiety about the Chevron framework, perhaps
even making some critics even more resolved to abandon it. Such reactions would be understandable if television-commercial-style claims
that Chevron could resolve all questions of administrative law in “just
two easy steps” could be believed.133 Yet, Chevron could no more do
that than most kitchen gadgets hawked on television can make gourmet cooking easy. Statutory interpretation can be just plain difficult.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
131 See SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REGULATORY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, A BLACKLETTER STATEMENT OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 35–36 (2d ed. 2013) (suggesting possible circumstances weighing against Chevron deference). Presumably the “major question” or
“extraordinary circumstance” test, situated at Step 1.2, could be characterized as one of these
“other circumstances.”
132 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
133 See supra text accompanying note 7.
129
130

R
R

R
R
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Rather than offering any persuasive reason for abandoning Chevron, explicating its Interstitial Steps in a decision-tree format only
brings greater clarity to the legal analysis. Whereas others have sometimes accused Chevron’s progeny of creating a muddled mess,134 the
decision tree shows that it is possible to see more clearly the structure
in the doctrine, however complex it might appear. Articulated complexity is, after all, better than muddled simplicity.
Not only is any increase in complexity more than made up for by
doctrinal clarity, but it can be readily accepted for at least two other
reasons. First, a mapping of Interstitial Steps merely shows the full
range of legal questions that confront courts before they can reach
Step 2; it does not imply that courts do, or necessarily should, run
through the entire list of Interstitial Steps when they grapple with an
agency’s statutory construction. Some steps may be quickly passed
over. In many instances, certain steps can be easily ignored in a given
court’s written opinion, as they could be in Chevron itself. Steps 1.1
and 1.2, for example, may be easily skipped in the typical case involving neither an express delegation of authority, akin to the Affordable
Care Act’s “essential health benefits” provisions,135 nor a major question of the kind involved in King.136 In most cases, Steps 1.5 and 1.6
will also not be implicated. The bulk of the cases will, presumably,
involve the well-recognized Mead steps (Steps 1.3 and 1.4) concerning
the agency’s use of rulemaking or formal adjudication.137 Both the Supreme Court and the lower courts seem able to work through these
steps in a rather practiced, even at times “rote,” fashion.138
Second, as noted at the outset of this Foreword, even Chevron’s
original two steps were nothing if not complicated. Neither could be
easily or meaningfully captured in a stepwise fashion. But assuming
they could, each would surely amount to more than a single step. Inside Step 1, for example, are nested many subsidiary steps, each to
reflect the major theories of statutory interpretation (i.e., textualism,
intentionalism, and purposivism) and varied uses for the “traditional
tools of statutory construction” that courts are supposed to rely on at
that first step.139 Producing just a list of major sources of legislative
See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 24.
See 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012).
136 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).
137 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
138 See Hickman, supra note 21, at 539, 549; see also Sunstein, supra note 2, at 193 (“When
agency decisions have the force of law or follow a formal procedure, Chevron continues to supply a simple rule . . . .”).
139 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
134

R

135

R
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history and their corresponding probative value would be quite a feat.
If simplicity is what one seeks, it might be best to steer clear of statutory interpretation altogether. The upshot for Chevron is that, by comparison to the complexity built into just Step 1, the marginal
complexity added by recognizing the Interstitial Steps seems hardly
great at all, and it does bring conceptual clarity to the justification for
Step 2 deference.
The six Interstitial Steps presented above also have more flexibility than it might seem. They are not rigid in the sense that they can be
ascended in more than just the order presented here. Although it
might generate some additional or unnecessary effort, a court could,
for example, take up the Mead steps (1.3 and 1.4) before the King step
(1.2). In addition, all six steps could be collapsed synthetically into a
single intervening step: Did Congress explicitly or implicitly delegate
clarifying or gap-filling authority to the agency? The answer to this
question determines whether a court should even contemplate giving
an agency’s interpretation controlling weight by moving from Step 1
to Step 2. Distilled into this single question, the six Interstitial Steps
collectively form the middle of a three-part doctrinal structure: Step 1,
the Interstitial Steps, and Step 2.
It is undeniable that there are other ways to order the analysis
reflected in the Interstitial Steps, beyond the structure shown in Figure 1. For example, assuming a relevant statutory provision is ambiguous, a court could find that Congress delegated clarifying or gap-filling
authority to the agency if either one of the following two conditions
hold:
1. If the statute expressly delegates definitional or interpretive authority to the agency; or
2. If either of the following conditions holds:
a. Both (i) the agency has been generally delegated the
authority to make binding law and is exercising that
authority, and (ii) the statutory issue presents no
“major question” nor other circumstances supporting the inference that Congress meant for the courts,
rather than the agency, to decide the question; or
b. Notwithstanding 2(a), other circumstances support
an implied delegation of interpretive authority to the
agency.
An agency operating under these conditions could be said to possess
an express or an implied delegation of interpretive authority, and

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-5\GWN501.txt

1366

unknown

Seq: 28

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

9-NOV-17

11:42

[Vol. 85:1339

courts should therefore defer to its reasonable interpretations at Step
2.140
The existence of other ways of organizing the Interstitial Steps
does not deny the essential point that, in some fashion or another, a
court confronting an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute
must consider a series of factors the Supreme Court has identified for
treating the agency as having exercised delegated authority and thus
becoming entitled to Chevron deference. Although perhaps never
quite articulated in a stepwise fashion as in this Foreword, Chevron’s
Interstitial Steps have long been a core part of the Court’s framework,
as even Chevron itself anticipated.141 Recognition of the doctrinal
place for the Interstitial Steps, however ordered, would go some distance toward removing the confusion that judges and scholarly observers have claimed follows from Mead and King.142 As will be
indicated in Part V, the Interstitial Steps approach also provides a response to those who assert that Chevron analysis amounts to an abdication of judicial responsibility.

140 It is possible to describe these conditions in still other ways as well. For example, one
might well ask a single question: Did Congress intend to leave the resolution of relevant statutory meaning to the agency? Then, answering that question might follow roughly along these
lines: “No” if (1) the statute is clear on its own, based on all the traditional tools of statutory
construction; (2) the statute is not clear but the resolution of statutory meaning is so vital that
Congress would not have wanted it to be left to the agency and hence changeable from administration to administration; or (3) Congress had never given the agency any authority to make
binding decisions. “Yes” at all other times, as long as the agency’s interpretation of the statute
(1) follows from the exercise of the agency’s authority to make binding decisions and (2) is
reasonable.
141 See supra notes 49–52, 68–73 and accompanying text.
142 To be clear, the claim here is simply that Chevron and its progeny provide a much
clearer conceptual ordering than has been generally thought, not that the Supreme Court or all
other federal courts have always consistently or coherently handled cases involving statutory
interpretation in the agency context. The conceptual ordering presented in this Foreword still
leaves much room for judicial discretion; the tests articulated at many of the steps in this structure are certainly not self-executing. As noted in the text, the ordering does not erase all the
difficulties inherent in statutory interpretation. Even with the ordering suggested by the Chevron
staircase, with its Interstitial Steps sandwiched between Steps 1 and 2, there remain genuine
questions for any court to confront, such as whether a particular statutory provision is ambiguous, whether a statutory question is sufficiently central to raise a major question, or whether
other circumstances exist to support or reject an implied delegation to an agency. No claim of
complete doctrinal determinacy or total interpretive ease should be implied from the stepwise
mapping provided in this Part. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging that statutory
interpretation under Chevron “is not always an easy matter”); see also supra notes 10–12 and
accompanying text.

R
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WHY “STEP 0” IS MISPLACED

To many readers, the Interstitial Steps mapped out in Part II will
share an important resemblance to another prevailing doctrinal
framework that also breaks Chevron analysis into three parts by inserting a Step 0 before Steps 1 and 2.143 Without question, Chevron’s
Interstitial Steps do bear an affinity with, and even could be said to
overlap with, what other scholars have characterized as Step 0. But
the Interstitial Steps are placed interstitially between Steps 1 and 2
rather than before them. In many cases, it will be possible to reach
identical results regardless of where the additional analysis is situated
in a court’s analysis. Yet, the notion of a Step 0 that precedes Step 1 is
ordinally and conceptually erroneous.
Those administrative law scholars who have articulated the notion of a Step 0 admittedly have provided much valuable insight about
factors courts should consider in deciding whether to imply a delegation of interpretive authority—and, in the main, their analysis is compatible with the argument presented here about questions a court
should ask before finding a delegation to an agency that would justify
the kind of obligatory deference called for at Step 2. Unfortunately,
the placement of these factors within a step that precedes Step 1 has
proven to be a source of confusion and a missed opportunity to recognize the substantial role that Chevron has left for courts in resolving
questions of law in disputes that involve administrative agencies.
Scholarly articulation of a Step 0 predates the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mead. Grappling with earlier decisions such as Christensen
v. Harris County,144 Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman offered a
prescient and influential article articulating a set of operating principles which amount, in their words, to a “step zero,” or “the inquiry
that courts should undertake before moving on to step one of Chevron.”145 The principles they articulated bear a close affinity with what
emerged from Mead and with what I have characterized in this Foreword as Chevron’s Interstitial Steps.146 Although Step 0 principles by
definition precede Step 1, Merrill and Hickman acknowledge that the
need for these principles actually derives from the need to justify
Chevron’s “mandatory deference” at Step 2.147 Merrill and Hickman
argue that the best justification for Step 2 deference could be found in
143
144
145
146
147

See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 13, at 836; supra text accompanying note 13.
529 U.S. 576 (2000).
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 13, at 845–48, 873 (emphasis added).
See id. at 873–74.
Id. at 873.

R
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the notion of “presumed congressional intent” to have courts defer
based on an “implied delegation of interpretational authority.”148 That
implied delegation should come, they argue, from finding at Step 0
that a statute “charges an agency with taking action that binds persons
outside the agency with the force of law.”149 What they do not explain
adequately, though, is why a determination that they recognize is
needed to justify deference under Step 2 should precede Step 1.
Cass Sunstein has written a highly influential and insightful article
critiquing the complexity that he claims has come to constitute Step
0.150 Writing after Mead and Barnhart v. Walton,151 Sunstein put forward the claim that these decisions created a “Step Zero inquiry,”152
one that, as in Merrill and Hickman’s articulation, constitutes “the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all.”153
Sunstein argues that this inquiry has become so complicated that it
“serves no useful purpose,”154 and he offers arguments for simplifying
that inquiry—arguments that presumably he might also make against
the six Interstitial Steps.155 But as a merely descriptive, doctrinal matter, Sunstein never explains why the “inquiry” he critiqued belongs
before Step 1, even though he, like Merrill and Hickman, rightly considers this inquiry’s main purpose to be one of justifying the Chevron
deference afforded at Step 2.156
Doctrinal clarity dictates placing between Steps 1 and 2 the kind
of inquiry that travels under the banner of Step 0, because it is precisely—and only—at that point in a court’s analysis that the need for
such an inquiry arises. Step 1 certainly does not demand any preliminary inquiry along the lines of Step 0. Only Step 2 does, which is why
such a preliminary inquiry occurs as a series of Interstitial Steps, not
as a Step 0.
148 Id. at 888; see also id. at 873 (treating Chevron’s “doctrine of mandatory deference [as]
based on an implied delegation of interpretational power from Congress”).
149 Id. at 920. Merrill and Hickman properly reject the notion that the basis for implying a
delegation of interpretive authority to an agency arises merely from the existence of an ambiguity or a gap in a statute. Id. After all, they reason, virtually every statute will “contain gaps and
ambiguities.” Id. For a court to decide that an agency’s interpretation merits Chevron’s “controlling weight,” something more is needed.
150

See Sunstein, supra note 2.

151

535 U.S. 212 (2002).

152

Sunstein, supra note 2, at 248.

153

Id. at 191.

154

Id. at 249.

155

Id. at 248–49.

156

See id. at 194, 247–48.
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Rejecting Step 0 but accepting the existence of Interstitial Steps
holds several meaningful advantages. First and foremost, disavowing
the placement of a Step 0 in favor of Interstitial Steps gives primacy to
the rule of law and to judges’ and agencies’ responsibility to uphold
and follow clearly articulated law.157 It is remarkably dissonant that
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars should ever even suggest that some
step or test precedes the requirement to respect clear, duly applicable
statutory provisions. Step 1 is, if nothing else, the epitome of what the
rule of law demands: courts and agencies must adhere to what statutes
say. Inserting a step prior to Step 1 unsettles this notion, however unintentionally, by suggesting that Step 1’s expression of a duty to observe clear rules might not always apply. This disquieting feature of
Step 0 persists even when it is understood, intellectually, that the alternative—if Step 1 were never to be reached—would remain the enforcement of a court’s best interpretation of the statute. Still, from the
standpoint of reinforcing the primacy of the rule of law, surely it
would be better never even to hint that Step 1 might not apply or to
suggest that courts and agencies might not need to honor a statute’s
clear provisions.158 It would be better, in other words, to place the socalled Step 0 inquiry about implied delegation where it belongs: after
Step 1 and before Step 2.
Second, for anyone truly concerned about the doctrinal complexity that Mead and other recent cases are said to have added to Chevron’s two-step framework, abandoning Step 0 in favor of Interstitial
Steps will simplify judges’ analytic tasks in many instances simply by
sparing judges the need to engage in so-called Step 0 analysis. Under a
doctrinal model with Step 0, the analysis of whether a delegation to
the agency should be implied—a parallel analysis to the inquiry called
for by Steps 1.1 or 1.6—must be undertaken in all cases. But if the
statute is clear and affords only one meaning, then the matter should
be settled at Step 1, period. Adding a Step 0 implies that its additional
analysis is needed in all cases involving agency interpretations of statutes, even those where deference at Step 2 is never implicated. For
157 Cf. LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 572 (1965) (noting that “where the judges are themselves convinced that certain reading, or application, of the
statute is the correct—or the only faithful—reading or application, they should intervene and so
declare”).
158 How rules are framed and presented can affect the legitimacy of the legal system. See,
e.g., Cary Coglianese & Kristin Firth, Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An Empirical Inquiry
into Norms About Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1909 (2016) (providing empirical
evidence showing “how specific types of doctrinal formulations affect public perceptions of
legitimacy”).
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example, if cases such as MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T
Co.159 and Brown & Williamson160 are indeed better viewed as Step 1
cases, as Cass Sunstein has argued, then rejecting the Step 0 construct
in favor of Interstitial Steps would advance the goal that Sunstein has
advocated: downplaying an “unnecessary emphasis” on trying to figure out whether Congress intended to delegate definitional authority
to the agency.161 Moving the implied delegation inquiry from the pivotal position at the very beginning of a judge’s analysis (Step 0) in
these cases to an intermediate position (Steps 1.1 to 1.6) serves to
downplay it.
Finally, abandoning Step 0 and recognizing the Interstitial Steps
should help reduce overall doctrinal confusion. Step 0 introduces confusion simply from the inherent lack of clarity about what “0” really
means as a step.162 More significantly, Step 0 mistakenly implies that
judges need to clear that step before reaching Step 1, adding jarring
ordinal distance and conceptual misplacement that invites confusion.
After all, it is Step 2, not Step 1, that depends on the type of inquiry
involved at what others have called Step 0.
Given what a Step 0 implies in terms of ordering, it is hardly surprising that scholars and judges have at times confusingly treated both
steps of Chevron, rather than just Step 2, as depending on the resolution of Step 0 analysis. As already noted, Sunstein has equated Chevron deference (Step 2) with the entire Chevron framework (Steps 1
and 2) when he described Step 0 as “the initial inquiry into whether
the Chevron framework applies at all.”163 Another scholar has noted
that “[i]n Chevron step zero, the court asks whether the Chevron
framework applies at all.”164 Still another has stated that “Mead lays
out legal preconditions for the Chevron framework to apply at all.”165
Judges sometimes seem to find themselves tripped up by Step 0 as
well, also equating Chevron deference (Step 2) with the entire Chevron framework (Steps 1 and 2). A recent panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit viewed its initial task as one of deter512 U.S. 218 (1994).
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
161 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 248–49.
162 Such confusion is akin to what a hotel guest experiences on first encounter with an
elevator with a button for a floor designated “0.” Does that button refer to the ground floor or to
a basement?
163 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 191.
164 Dorf, supra note 104.
165 ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 202 (2016).
159
160

R

R
R
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mining whether the agency had satisfied Mead’s “preconditions to application of the Chevron framework.”166 Another panel of the same
court noted that, “[a]t Chevron step zero,” the question becomes
“whether the Chevron framework applies at all.”167 In National Cable
& Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,168 only after
the majority of the Supreme Court found that the Mead factors were
satisfied did the Court conclude that it must “apply the Chevron
framework to the Commission’s interpretation of the Communications Act.”169
These examples of judges and scholars confusing the entire Chevron “framework” with Chevron “deference” may, of course, merely
reflect lawyerly shorthand or unintended imprecision, rather than genuine confusion on the part of those judges and scholars who write as if
the entire Chevron edifice, instead of just its deference, depends on
Step 0. It is also admittedly the case that if a court does proceed first
with the Step 0 inquiry and finds Chevron deference unjustified, then
it would never need to answer the question about statutory ambiguity
embedded in Step 1. A court could then simply identify its best interpretation of the statute, regardless of whether that interpretation is
the only possible one. Although that implication does follow, it also is
true that if a court does complete Step 0 and finds Chevron deference
justified, it still may never reach Step 2 nor award deference to the
agency’s interpretation. A court still could find that the statute clearly
resolves the question at Step 1.
Step 0 cannot be defended by saying that answering it one way
would obviate the need for Steps 1 and 2. After all, that same logic
could be offered in defense of a still earlier step—perhaps it might be
called Step -1 (that is, negative one)—which could move to the forefront a variant of the Step 2 question and ask whether an agency’s
interpretation is unreasonable.170 If the agency’s interpretation were
unreasonable, then the court need never ask or answer Steps 0 or 1
(or Step 1 and the Interstitial Steps). But the mere fact that an answer
to one question might rule out other questions does not justify placing
166

Sharemaster v. SEC, 847 F.3d 1059, 1066 n.5 (9th Cir. 2017).

167

Or. Rest. & Lodging Ass’n v. Perez, 816 F.3d 1080, 1086 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016).

168

545 U.S. 967 (2005).

169

Id. at 980–81.

I am not the first to suggest the possibility of a Step -1. Michael Dorf labels as “a kind of
Chevron-step-negative-one ruling” an altogether different approach, where the court would look
directly at whether the type of claim at issue was authorized by the statute, without regard to
whether Chevron applied to the agency’s interpretation. Dorf, supra note 104.
170
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that question first in the analytic line, prior to what the Supreme
Court has treated as Chevron’s first step.
The strongest justification for placing Step 1 first stems from fidelity to law and the primacy of statutes. If a statute’s meaning is
clear, then it controls and there exists no possible question about
whether Congress implicitly delegated resolution of a statutory ambiguity to the agency—because no such ambiguity exists. At least until
the Court or Congress overturns Chevron or repudiates its overall
framework, doctrine in this area will remain more faithful to law and
less confusing if it does not imply that the entire framework of Chevron, including Step 1, depends on the resolution of some other precedent analysis.
Even Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in King v. Burwell, which
has too commonly been viewed as having brushed the Chevron framework aside, remained faithful to Chevron’s first step. King nowhere
denied Step 1’s requirement that courts “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”171 On the contrary, the
Court’s opinion in King proceeded to defend its own best interpretation of the relevant part of the statute only after concluding that “the
meaning of the phrase ‘established by the State’ is not so clear.”172
Although not explicitly using the label of Step 1, the Court did anything but bypass this step or repudiate the entire Chevron framework.
It expressly acknowledged statutory ambiguity before proceeding with
its search for the statute’s best meaning:
The upshot of all this is that the phrase “an Exchange
established by the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031]” is properly viewed as ambiguous. The phrase may be limited in its
reach to State Exchanges. But it is also possible that the
phrase refers to all Exchanges—both State and Federal—at
least for purposes of the tax credits. . . .
The conclusion that Section 36B is ambiguous is further
supported by several provisions that assume tax credits will
be available on both State and Federal Exchanges. . . .
....
. . . After reading Section 36B along with other related
provisions in the Act, we cannot conclude that the phrase
“an Exchange established by the State under [Section
18031]” is unambiguous.173
171
172
173

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2490 (2015).
Id. at 2491–92 (alterations besides ellipses in original).
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Given the attention the King Court paid to statutory ambiguity before
proceeding to offer its own best interpretation, it is difficult to see
how, as one commentator has argued, “[a]fter King v. Burwell, the
‘major questions’ doctrine is emphatically a Chevron Step Zero question,” to be analyzed “[b]efore even beginning to apply Chevron’s
two-step approach.”174
To be fair, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion did, admittedly, take
up its brief discussion of Chevron and its treatment of the “extraordinary cases” step (Step 1.2) in a prefatory section that preceded a more
extended account of the statute’s ambiguity.175 In this respect, the
King opinion is no different than other Supreme Court opinions that
have presented the Chevron steps selectively or with some variation in
their ordering.176 Yet the majority opinion in King still demonstrates
that even when the Court rejects an implied delegation to the agency
to resolve statutory ambiguities, that rejection of agency interpretive
authority does not make the entire Chevron framework inapplicable.
Unlike what is suggested by those who advocate for a Step 0, Chevron’s Step 1 still applies; a court still needs to follow the unambiguous
meaning of the statute—if one exists.
King also shows that a court will always confront the need to enforce the unambiguous meaning of a statute, if the statute affords but
one possible meaning—or, if it does not, the need to find another way
to resolve a dispute over alternative meanings. Chevron Step 1 speaks
to how a court should address the first of these needs, and the Interstitial Steps provide the conceptual structure for resolving the second by
focusing on whether a court should decide on its own or should defer
to the agency. In some circumstances, where a court finds that Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated authority to the agency, the
174 Adam White, Symposium: Defining Deference Down, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2015,
11:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-defining-deference-down/.
175

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.

For an extreme example of a formulation of the Chevron test that departs from the
traditional multistep framework, see Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218
(2009), noting that the agency’s “view governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute—
not necessarily the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the courts.” Although the Court’s presentation of Chevron may not always follow the
stepwise order presented in this Foreword, what matters is the conceptual ordering which remains reflected in the Court’s reasoning in most cases, even if that ordering is also flexible
enough to be presented in different ways. See supra text accompanying notes 135–38. Furthermore, because some steps may be easy to surmount and others difficult, the Court might well
gloss over the easy ones. If the Step 1 ambiguity seems glaring to the Court in a particular case, it
might well proceed rather speedily to further steps—but that does not mean Step 1 does not
exist.
176
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Interstitial Steps will lead the court toward the top of the Chevron
staircase, where it must defer at Step 2 to a reasonable interpretation
provided by the agency. In the remaining circumstances, where an implied delegation to the agency cannot be sustained, the interstitial
Chevron analysis will, as in King, lead the court to resolve the dispute
based on its own best interpretation, perhaps treating the agency’s interpretation as helpful or persuasive guidance in accord with
Skidmore.
In an area of the law that already has prompted jurists to worry
about the introduction of “protracted confusion,”177 perpetuating an
antecedent Step 0 only continues to invite unnecessary confusion,
leading scholars and judges sometimes to suggest that somehow Step
1—fidelity to a statute’s clear meaning—might potentially not apply.
But Step 1 always applies; Chevron deference centers on Step 2. For
this reason, it is better to recognize Chevron’s multistep framework
for what it is: Step 1, Interstitial Steps, and Step 2.
IV. ON

THE

VALUE

OF

DISTINCT STEPS 1

AND

2

Other scholars have moved in the opposite direction, away from a
multistep framework, seeking to simplify matters by urging that Chevron’s analysis be collapsed into just a single step.178 If this view were
correct, then Chevron would no longer comprise two steps between
which additional steps could be situated. It is thus important to consider the case for collapsing Chevron to a single step. Doing so shows
that a single-step approach falters. Such an approach fundamentally
misses the distinct roles served by Steps 1 and 2, including what they
mean for justifying deference and for allowing agencies to adapt their
implementation of statutes over time.
Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule have made the most
forceful case for collapsing Chevron’s two steps into “a single inquiry
into the reasonableness of the agency’s statutory interpretation.”179
Bracketing consideration of so-called Step 0 concerns,180 Stephenson
and Vermeule argue that Step 1 and Step 2 each ask the same basic
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 245 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See supra note 14.
179 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 597–98. David Zaring has also argued that
the courts in effect apply a single “reasonable agency standard” in Chevron cases. Zaring, supra
note 14, at 195. Zaring takes more of a descriptive approach, highlighting what decisions courts
actually make, but in a more normative vein he considers Stephenson and Vermeule’s position to
be “probably correct,” while also “noting that their argument is an unconventional one.” Id. at
157.
180 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 598 n.4.
177
178

R
R

R
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question: whether an agency’s interpretation is “permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation.”181 As such, they claim that decisions at
Steps 1 and 2 “are always mutually convertible.”182 Any conclusion
that an agency’s interpretation contravenes the clear meaning of the
statute at Step 1 means that the same interpretation is unreasonable at
Step 2; correspondingly, any judicial decision reached at Step 2 could
be “rewritten” in Step 1 terms.183
Stephenson and Vermeule’s account helpfully illuminates an unassailable relationship between Steps 1 and 2. It is obviously correct
that an agency interpretation that contravenes the clear meaning of a
statute at Step 1 would also be unreasonable.184 It is also correct that a
finding of unreasonableness at Step 2 necessarily implies that the statute’s meaning clearly does not accommodate the agency’s interpretation.185 Yet their argument that Steps 1 and 2 are essentially
indistinguishable ultimately fails to convince for several reasons.
Chevron does have two main steps, and thus courts need to consider
the steps between them as well.
Part of what weakens Stephenson and Vermeule’s position is its
failure to live up to their own billing. They claim, for instance, that “a
unitary logic”186 underlies Steps 1 and 2, such that both steps can be
said to be “analytically equivalent.”187 Yet they acknowledge that any
such unity in the two steps depends entirely on reframing the questions that courts are supposed to answer at each step.188 The purported
equivalence of Step 1 and Step 2 findings appears only conceivable if
the Step 1 “question is framed not as ‘What does this statute mean?’
but rather ‘Is the agency’s interpretation within the permissible range
of readings?’”189 Yet analytical equivalence should presumably hinge
on more than just a stipulated reframing. Asking whether an agency’s
interpretation falls within a permissible range of interpretations may
181

Id. at 599.

182

Id. at 600.

183

Id. at 599–600.

As Justice Scalia has written, “if Congress has directly spoken to an issue then any
agency interpretation contradicting what Congress has said would be unreasonable.” Entergy
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 (2009). Zaring similarly notes that “there are no
cases that would fail step one and not also fail step two.” Zaring, supra note 14, at 156.

R

185

See supra text accompanying note 170; see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.

R

186

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 600.

R

187

Id.

188

See id.

189

Id.

184
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be related to the question posed at Step 1, but it is different. It is
actually the question of Step 2.190
Consider the Clean Air Act, the statute at issue in Chevron. Step
1 asks whether the term “source” in the Act possesses a clear statutory meaning with respect to the issue under dispute. That issue was
essentially whether a “source” of air pollution meant just the individual smokestacks and pipes at a regulated facility, as opposed to the
facility overall. Using traditional tools of statutory construction, the
Chevron Court held that “source” had no clear meaning in the statute.191 However, the Court’s search for a clear meaning under Step 1
was different than asking whether, in the face of statutory ambiguity,
it would nevertheless be reasonable for an agency to define “source”
in a particular way. It was reasonable for the EPA to construe
“source” either as individual smokestacks and pipes or as an entire
facility, with its multiple smokestacks and pipes. But had the EPA defined “source” to include third-party suppliers of the raw materials
that result in the air pollution emitted through the facility’s smokestacks and pipes, that may well not have been a reasonable interpretation. The question at Step 2 is not about the precision of the meaning
of “source” in the statute, as it is at Step 1, but about the whether a
particular agency interpretation falls within the range of reasonable
meanings. A court could well conclude that it does not, but this is
indeed different than determining whether there exists only one reasonable interpretation.192
Perhaps a more telling internal weakness in Stephenson and
Vermeule’s argument stems from the fact that their purported singlestep approach to Chevron implicitly contains multiple steps. Notwith-

190 See Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 612 (2014)
(“The one-step version of Chevron that Stephenson and Vermeule propose is essentially the
same verbal formulation as step two.”). Re incisively elaborates the internal limitations of Stephenson and Vermeule’s argument for a single-step approach. See id. at 610–13.
191 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862 (1984) (finding
the statutory language “not dispositive” and the legislative history “unilluminating”).
192 Instead of a “unitary logic,” what appears to unite Chevron’s two questions is a search
for a common quality: clarity. A statute may have a clear meaning with respect to the particular
issue under dispute (Step 1); if the statute lacks clear meaning, an agency’s statutory interpretation may still clearly fall outside a zone of reasonableness (Step 2). This allows Stephenson and
Vermeule and others to point out, correctly, that an unreasonable interpretation of a statute is
one that is clearly contrary to the statute. But that is still different than saying that the statute
has a clear meaning which affords no room for interpretation. Steps 1 and 2 do call for different
inquiries, linked simply with a judicial quest for clarity with respect to each.
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION193

standing their claim to “simplify matters,”194 the way their approach
actually involves multiple steps becomes apparent from their otherwise helpful spatial representation of statutory meaning, reproduced
here as Figure 2. One point on the line, labeled “A,” represents a
court’s best interpretation of the relevant provision of a statute,
around which appears a penumbra they call a “zone of ambiguity.”195
They posit two different agency interpretations of the same statutory
provision: one they label “B,” that lies inside the zone of ambiguity,
and another they label “C,” that lies outside.196 Given Stephenson and
Vermeule’s emphasis on a single analytical step—their “unitary logic
that requires only one step”197—we might well expect that something
like their illuminating spatial model appears to judges fully formed, in
a single instant, much like it appears as Figure 2 here. But the features
represented in the figure cannot be instantaneously perceived—nor
should they be, consistent with Chevron.
To see how Stephenson and Vermeule’s account demands that
judges make multiple determinations, consider how they describe the
interpretive process in reference to their spatial diagram. They write
that “[t]he statutory language, read in light of the traditional tools of
statutory construction, will suggest to the reviewing court”198 each of
the following:
i. “a ‘best’ interpretation of the statute (interpretation ‘A’
in the diagram)”;199
193 This Figure is a slightly modified version of the one appearing in Stephenson &
Vermeule, supra note 14, at 601.
194 Id. at 609.
195 See id. at 601.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 600.
198 Id. at 601.
199 Id. It is not entirely evident from Stephenson and Vermeule’s account—with their quotation marks around “best” and their use of the verb “suggest”—whether such a best interpretation by the court must be definitive at this stage, or merely provisional. But either way, it would
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ii. “a range of interpretations that are sufficiently plausible
that the court would view them as reasonable, though
not ideal”200—a decision which they claim calls for more
than just traditional statutory tools but “may depend in
part on other factors, such as the court’s confidence in
the agency’s expertise, its sympathy for the agency’s policy goals, or its assessment of the importance of the interpretive issue”;201 and
iii. a determination whether the agency’s interpretation (interpretation “B” or “C”) lies within the zone of
ambiguity.202
Rather than collapsing analysis to a single step, Stephenson and
Vermeule’s explanation reveals, in much the same fashion as Chevron
does, the several determinations that a court must make and consider
when deciding whether to uphold an agency’s interpretation of a statute. Stephenson and Vermeule may very well resist calling these determinations “steps”—but it is hard not to see Chevron’s two main
steps, or something close to them, implicit in their model.203 Is the best
interpretation so clear that the range of reasonable interpretations
(zone of ambiguity) only affords one reading of the statute (Step 1)?
If not, is the agency’s interpretation within the range of reasonable
interpretations (Step 2)?
Ultimately, Stephenson and Vermeule’s argument for a singlestep approach to Chevron fails for even more important reasons than
its internal weaknesses. The thrust of their argument is that two steps
are useless.204 They assert that there exists “no good reason why we
should decide whether the statute has only one possible reading [Step
represent a distinct step; without it, no point “A” could be identified around which a “zone of
ambiguity” could be built.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 601 n.19.
202 Id. at 601.
203 Stephenson and Vermeule’s spatial diagram, to the extent it illustrates how judges
should approach statutory questions, would appear to call for judges to do potentially more work
than Chevron demands, at least in some cases. Chevron’s two main steps, after all, do not require
judges always to identify the “best” interpretation, but to do so only in cases where, at Step 1,
the statute clearly permits only a single interpretation. Chevron also does not require fully marking out a zone of ambiguity, but rather it requires just a determination of whether that zone is
wider than a single point (Step 1) and whether it extends at least as far as the agency’s interpretation (Step 2). Granted, Stephenson and Vermeule’s spatial diagram is merely a model or illustration, and it is an admirable one at that. Nevertheless, what it illustrates is less than supportive
of an argument for a single step to Chevron.
204 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 601–02 (arguing that distinguishing the two
steps serves “no useful purpose”).
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1] before deciding simply whether the agency’s interpretation falls
into the range of permissible interpretations [Step 2].”205 They suggest
that “nothing of consequence turns on whether the set of permissible
interpretations has one element or more than one element.”206 In their
defense, the futility of the two steps might seem to follow naturally
from a belief that courts virtually never reject an agency interpretation
at Step 2.207 In such a world, case outcomes under Chevron’s two-step
approach in practice would be indistinguishable from those under a
one-step approach, according to which judges would always defer to
the agency’s interpretation unless it is clearly contrary to the statute.
In reality, although it can be difficult to find examples of the Supreme
Court setting aside agency interpretations at Step 2, lower courts apparently do so in at least a small percentage of cases.208 For present
purposes, however, empirical evidence, one way or the other, is
largely beside the point. It may well be the case that, once the court
reaches the top of the Chevron staircase, the agency almost always
wins. Judicial resolution at Step 2 might constitute a relatively trivial
step in most cases, especially if agencies generally make reasonable
interpretive choices. But for purposes of assessing the legal significance of distinguishing Chevron’s two steps, just focusing on agency
wins and losses risks missing the importance of a Chevron analysis
with two distinct main steps.
Steps 1 and 2, each in their way, help courts and agencies, and
even Congress, by clarifying whether agencies have flexibility to adapt
statutory understandings over time. A court decision that simply upholds an agency interpretation as permissible does not inform the
agency whether it might be able to adopt a different, but still potentially permissible or reasonable, interpretation in the future. By way
of illustration, consider Michael Herz’s hypothetical of an agency that
defines the Clean Water Act’s jurisdictional terms—“waters of the
United States”—to include “the sands of the Arizona desert.”209 Herz
Id. at 602.
Id.
207 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 319 (8th ed. 2017) (asserting that “it is rare for a court to set
aside an agency interpretation in step two”).
208 See Barnett & Walker, supra note 28, at 34 (finding that, in circuit court decisions from
2003 to 2013 that were resolved at Step 2, agency interpretations were rejected in 6.2% of cases);
Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 47 (1998) (finding that, in circuit court decisions
from the years 1995 and 1996 that were resolved at Step 2, agency interpretations were rejected
in 11% of cases).
209 Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
205
206
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argues that a court might strike down such an agency interpretation
on either Step 1 or Step 2 grounds, and that either way “the point is
the same.”210 It is true that either way the agency would lose. But the
options for the agency in the future will be quite different depending
on the step upon which the court relies. If the court were to strike
down the interpretation under Step 1 because it concludes that “waters of the United States,” properly understood using the traditional
tools of statutory construction, clearly means permanent waterways—
that is, surface rivers and lakes—then the agency will be limited in its
ability to adapt the definition over time to include wetlands or even
underground water flows beneath desert sands. On the other hand,
the agency would retain such flexibility if the court concluded that
“waters of the United States” contains considerable ambiguity (as in
reality it does). An agency could reasonably define “waters” at a later
time to include not just permanent surface waterways but also wetlands, intermittent streams, and even underground flows.211 That flexibility would remain even if a court should strike down an agency’s
desert sands interpretation at Step 2, concluding that whatever “waters” means it does not encompass solids such as sand.
Distinguishing Steps 1 and 2 thus holds important implications for
future actions by agencies. Given that ideas about how to implement
statutes can change over time, whether in the face of changing conditions in the world or in the political control of government, agencies
not infrequently confront the need to decide whether or how to
change the way they carry out their statutory missions.212 It may be no
accident that some of the most significant agency statutory interpretaUnder Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 220–21 (1992). The phrase “waters of the United
States” can be found in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012); it is the notion of an agency construing these
words to encompass sands in a desert that is hypothetical.
210 Herz, supra note 209, at 221.
See id. at 218 n.143; see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two
Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 616 (2009) (noting that “a judicial determination that an agency
interpretation embodies one option within the zone of indeterminacy makes it possible for the
agency to put forth a different interpretation at a later time”).
212 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984)
(noting that “everyday realities” and “the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to
inform its judgments” can be proper bases for agency decisions). This possibility of administrative policy change in the face of changing realities or new political control helps explain why
what agencies do when they interpret statutes is an executive rather than judicial function. Judicial interpretation seeks the best interpretation of the statute—often described as determining
what Congress intended in passing the statute—which is generally treated as fixed and subsequently secured through stare decisis. By contrast, a delegation to an agency almost always entails some authority to adapt over time in response to changing conditions, additional
knowledge, or new governing priorities.
211
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tion cases—Chevron,213 Mead,214 and Brown & Williamson,215 among
them—have arisen from agency reversals of preexisting interpretive
positions, sometimes longstanding ones.216
Attentiveness to such statutory dynamism openly emerged during
oral arguments in King v. Burwell, where Chief Justice Roberts’s only
substantive question centered on how a possible Court decision at
Step 2 would affect the agency’s ability to change course. Responding
to the government’s argument for deference, Roberts asked the government’s lawyers: “[I]f you’re right about Chevron, that would indicate that a subsequent administration could change that
interpretation?”217 With statutory change on Roberts’s mind, no one
should be surprised that he authored a majority opinion that stopped
short of Chevron Step 2, because a decision upholding federal exchanges at that step would have allowed a subsequent administration
to reinterpret the Affordable Care Act to preclude federal exchanges.218 Had the Court followed a single-step Chevron approach,
holding merely that the government’s interpretation had been permissible or reasonable, the circumstance would have been little different.
A future administration would not know whether an alternative interpretation might also be reasonable—and it might well conclude that
the leading alternative would indeed be reasonable.219 But the King
Court did not take a single-step approach, which would have merely
declared the agency’s interpretation permissible. Rather, the Court’s
opinion makes plain that the agency’s interpretation prevailed not because of deference but because it happened to be the same as the
213 Id. at 863 (noting “[t]he fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of the term ‘source’ ”).
214 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 225 (2001) (noting that, in its interpretation
of the relevant statutory provision, “Customs changed its position”).
215 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (noting that “[i]n
1996, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), after having expressly disavowed any such
authority since its inception, asserted jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products”).
216 As the Chevron Court noted, the fact that an agency has modified its interpretation over
time does not diminish the deference that the agency’s interpretation is due. See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 863. That deference, as explained in Part I, derives from an express or implied delegation
from Congress to the agency.
217 Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114).
218 See supra notes 96–103 and accompanying text.
219 It is difficult to see how an interpretation limited to state exchanges would fail a decision rule calling for “courts to defer to the agency’s views unless clear and specific language, in
the provision immediately at issue, bars the agency interpretation.” ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 229 (2006).
As discussed in Part I, a states-only interpretation would not have been clearly barred by the
Affordable Care Act’s language referring to exchanges “established by the State.”
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Court’s best interpretation of the statute, under circumstances in
which it was improper to imply a delegation of interpretive resolution
authority to the agency, owing to the failure to satisfy one of the Interstitial Steps (namely, Step 1.2).
For these reasons, when courts distinguish Steps 1 and 2, as Chevron calls on them to do, they can resolve disputes in a manner that
informs agencies about the possibility of future interpretive latitude
available to them. Agency officials that lose a case at Step 1, or after a
court fails to make it up the Interstitial Steps, know that they need not
waste time proposing an alternative administrative interpretation. In
such situations, members of Congress also know that, if they want to
see the agency take a different approach, the onus is on the legislature
to amend the statute.220 Correspondingly, under Chevron’s two-step
approach, a decision at Step 2 informs agency officials that they have
an option to change course in the future.221
Beyond what follows from Chevron’s distinct steps for future
agency interpretations, the need to distinguish between the two steps
is also vital for justifying Chevron’s mandatory deference in the first
place. That deference demands legal justification because it marks a
departure from the courts’ normal approach to resolving questions of
statutory meaning. The principal reason for distinguishing Steps 1 and
2, then, derives from the need to justify this shift through a delegation
to the agency.222 Determining whether the permissible range of statutory meaning comprises just one interpretation or more than one reasonable interpretation is essential for that justification. If the statute’s
meaning is clear, affording the agency no room for interpretation,
then the court cannot justify implying any delegation to the agency.
Finding ambiguity at Step 1 is thus a necessary, even though not sufficient, condition for a court to find a delegation of definitional or interpretive authority. If ambiguity does exist—meaning the statute’s zone
of ambiguity is wide enough to accommodate more than one reasona220 Congress eventually did exactly that following Brown & Williamson with respect to the
Food and Drug Administration’s authority to regulate tobacco. See Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 101(b)(3), 123 Stat. 1776, 1786–87 (2009); see
also 21 U.S.C. § 387a (2012).
221 The varying precedential effects of decisions based on Step 1 and Step 2 are articulated
in Justice Thomas’s majority opinion in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005). For a compatible account, see Re, supra note 190, at
614–17.
222 Although a case for such deference might be made on policy or institutional grounds,
the formal legal justification hinges on an express or implied delegation of authority to the
agency by statute and on courts’ consequent obligation to respect that delegation. See supra Part
I.
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ble interpretation—a court may then proceed up the staircase toward
Step 2. A court that successfully ascends the Interstitial Steps has determined that the agency holds delegated interpretive authority and
then the court must respect that delegation by letting the agency’s interpretation stand, provided it falls within the confines of interpretive
reasonableness.223
In the end, Stephenson and Vermeule’s case for a single-step approach to Chevron fails for a variety of reasons: it does not live up to
the unifying and simplifying claims made for it; it overlooks the key
implication for statutory adaptation that follows from distinguishing
Steps 1 and 2; and, most importantly, it misses how these distinctions
provide courts the basis for justifying deference to agency interpretations. The Chevron staircase—with its distinct bottom and top steps,
as well as its Interstitial Steps—does not collapse to a single step.
Before turning in the final part of this Foreword to a discussion of
broader implications of the Interstitial Steps for Chevron’s future, one
remaining issue merits mention: the meaning of “reasonableness” at
Step 2. Although the conceptual scaffolding of the Chevron staircase
does not depend on exactly what makes an agency interpretation reasonable, one prevailing view holds that the reasonableness inquiry at
Step 2 calls for nothing more than the application of the arbitrary and
capricious standard under the APA.224 Stephenson and Vermeule, in
arguing that Steps 1 and 2 are “redundant,” correctly point out that
treating Step 2 as nothing more than arbitrary and capricious review
also effectively collapses doctrinal steps.225 That approach replaces
Step 2’s test for interpretive reasonableness with a separate analysis of
the kind called for under the APA, as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.226 Although replacing Step 2 with
State Farm does not collapse Chevron’s two-step edifice, it might be
seen effectively to concede Stephenson and Vermeule’s point that
223 Step 2’s insistence on interpretive reasonableness “can and should be a meaningful limitation on the ability of administrative agencies to exploit statutory ambiguities, assert farfetched
interpretations, and usurp undelegated policymaking discretion.” Global Tel*Link v. FCC, 866
F.3d 397, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Silberman, J., concurring).
224 Ronald Levin has offered the most articulate and forceful argument that the test for
reasonableness at Step 2 is essentially the same as the arbitrary and capricious test. See Levin,
supra note 7, at 1263–65. It has won broader acceptance. See Emily Hammond et al., Judicial
Review of Statutory Issues Under the Chevron Doctrine, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 65, 94–98 (Michael E. Herz et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015).
225 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 602–03.
226 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 603 (citing the “arbitrary
and capricious” standard prescribed in State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–44).
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Chevron’s two steps are doing no separate work, as one of them can
be replaced with another test altogether.227
But Step 2, properly conceived, does call for inquiry distinct from
arbitrary and capricious review, even though both focus on reasonableness. Together, Chevron and State Farm demand judicial inquiry
about three conditions: statutory clarity or precision (Chevron Step 1);
interpretive reasonableness by the agency (Chevron Step 2); and reasoned decisionmaking by the agency (arbitrary and capricious review).
Under State Farm, the courts are supposed to use arbitrary and capricious review to look for sound policy judgment, explanations that are
consistent with evidence, and the consideration of significant alternatives.228 Step 2, by contrast, calls for a reasonableness of linguistic and
interpretive meaning: whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute falls within the zone of ambiguity. To be sure, Step 2 also demands
sound judgment and cogent reasoning, but its reasonableness is an interpretive reasonableness—necessitated by the express or implied delegation to the agency of the authority to select the meaning of
ambiguous statutory provisions.229 Congress could repeal section
706(2)(A) of the APA upon which arbitrary and capricious review is
based and yet Chevron Step 2 would be unaffected. The inquiry at
Step 2 is focused on the statute the agency is charged with implementing—on its meaning—with the aim of determining whether that statute can accommodate the agency’s interpretation.230
227 Stephenson and Vermeule memorably characterize the predicament as a doctrinal game
of musical chairs, in which three doctrines compete for space on two chairs. Stephenson &
Vermeule, supra note 14, at 604. Another metaphor might be of three electrical plugs that need
to fit into only two receptacles. Treating Step 2 as the same as arbitrary and capricious review is
like deciding only to plug in Step 1 and State Farm. Stephenson and Vermeule, by contrast,
advocate for keeping State Farm plugged in but might be said to favor a two-plug adaptor to
combine Steps 1 and 2, plugging them in together into the other receptacle.
228 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–44.
229 In this sense, the requirement of interpretive reasonableness at Step 2 combines with
the language of the statute itself to operate much as any “intelligible principle” does with respect
to ordinary delegations of authority, by cabining an agency’s exercise of its delegated authority.
See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)
(explaining that delegated power must be “canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing”). For example, even though statutory ambiguity and the Interstitial Steps justified the Chevron Court in implying a delegation of authority to the EPA to construe the Clean Air Act, that
delegation cannot be unbounded such that the agency could construe the statute in any way it
might like. Despite the ambiguity in certain Clean Air Act provisions, they certainly could not
lawfully be construed by the EPA to impose new capital adequacy requirements on banks or to
change standards for criminal racketeering. Cf. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2708 (2015)
(“Chevron . . . does not license interpretive gerrymanders . . . .”).
230 See SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REGULATORY PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note
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To illustrate the difference between Step 2 and arbitrary and capricious review, consider the familiar example of a statute that declares, “No vehicles in the park.”231 “Vehicles” is ambiguous.232 An
agency charged with implementing such a statute could reasonably
consider automobiles and motorcycles to be vehicles, and thus prohibit them from the park. Bicycles, roller skates, and scooters might
present closer calls. But consider a further possibility: the agency
charged with implementing the statute confronts a serious problem of
persistent litter in the park discarded by picnickers, and the trash has
also started to attract bears and create a safety risk for visitors. Imagine that the park agency carefully studies the problem, assesses all the
relevant evidence on trash levels and bear sightings, considers a broad
range of alternative solutions, prepares a model benefit-cost analysis,
and, in the end, provides cogent reasons for its decision to construe
the “no vehicles in the park” provision to ban picnicking in the park.
The agency could have fully met even the most rigorous demands of
hard look review under the arbitrary and capricious standard, but it
would still be precluded from interpreting “vehicles” to mean eating.233 Construing “no vehicles” as “no picnicking” would prove unreasonable on interpretive grounds—no matter how reasonable and
well-reasoned such a prohibition might be on the kind of policy
grounds addressed by the arbitrary and capricious standard.
For the same reason, an interpretation that is interpretively reasonable under Step 2 might not be justified under the arbitrary and
131, at 34 (articulating a test of “whether the statute, even if subject to more than one interpretation, can support the particular interpretation adopted by the agency”).
231 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607–08 (1958) (using the example to illustrate how words can have a “core of settled meaning” as well as “a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable
nor obviously ruled out”).
232 It is of course conceivable that, under some versions of such a statute and for some
purposes, were a court to use all the tools of interpretation, what constitutes a “vehicle” might
well be sufficiently clear at Step 1. The point here is illustrative, with the example of a generally
ambiguous term used to contrast Step 2 and arbitrary and capricious review. Other examples
could work for this same illustrative purpose. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means
of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (2014) (“If a statute crisply states ‘no handguns
in the National Parks,’ that wording seems to convey relatively little discretion. If the statute
instead says ‘no dangerous weapons,’ that signal makes the exercise of broad discretion
inevitable.”).
233 This is to put to the side the possibility that, as a behavioral matter, a mere prohibition
on vehicles in the park could in fact diminish the number of picnickers too. See Frederick
Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 1134 (2008) (“[I]t is
important that we not forget about the driver of a pickup truck, with family and picnic preparations in tow, who sees the “No Vehicles in the Park” sign at the entrance to the park and simply
turns around.”).
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capricious standard. An interpretation to construe the “no vehicles”
statute to include electric wheelchairs might well be reasonable on interpretive grounds—the relevant statutory provision could support
it—but the agency might make its decision hastily without undertaking any study and without considering evidence or alternative options
advanced in public comments, such as information showing that electric wheelchairs result in no injuries, create virtually no noise or air
pollution, and help people enjoy the park, and that any problems associated with their use could be addressed by other policies.234
The key lesson is that Step 2’s reasonableness criterion calls for
an inquiry into interpretive reasonableness, which is different than
policy reasonableness or reasoned decisionmaking under the APA’s
arbitrary and capricious standard. Step 2 creates no redundancy with
either State Farm or Step 1. Chevron does have two distinct main
steps—with steps in between.
V. IMPLICATIONS

FOR

CHEVRON’S FUTURE

When Chevron is properly conceived in terms of a Step 1 and a
Step 2 as the bottom and top steps of a larger staircase, the logic behind Chevron deference fares better as both a doctrinal and normative
matter. Given the current controversy surrounding the Chevron doctrine’s future, at the very least the doctrine and its rationale should be
better understood. The Interstitial Steps aim to ensure that judicial
deference under Step 2 does not, as a doctrinal matter, automatically
follow from a mere finding of statutory ambiguity under Step 1. Chevron analysis calls for additional judicial work to clear one or more
hurdles designed to ensure that courts make sensible imputations of
gap-filling delegations to agencies. These additional determinations
demand a robust and traditional role for the courts, one not unlike
those in which judges are routinely called upon in deciding all other
kinds of cases for which they must make legal determinations. The
234 For a more realistic example, consider a scenario like that in Chevron, but where the
EPA overlooks important comments, ignores pivotal evidence, or fails to offer reasons for its
action. A finding that the EPA acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner would not necessarily
make the agency’s construction of the statute any less reasonable as a matter of interpretation.
What it would do instead is undermine the validity of the EPA’s underlying rulemaking in which
the interpretation can be found, which would prevent the Court from even reaching Step 2. As
both Mead and Step 1.4 of the framework in Part II of this Foreword indicate, an agency must
properly use its rulemaking authority to receive the deference afforded an agency at Step 2. See
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (holding that an agency’s failure
to explain its interpretation is arbitrary and capricious and thus prevents a court from providing
Chevron deference).
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legal determinations that judges must make in confronting Chevron’s
Interstitial Steps aim to ensure independent judicial judgment and adherence to the rule of law, including appropriate respect for legislative
delegations of authority to administrative agencies.
As noted at the outset of this Foreword, Chevron has come under
attack lately by certain scholars, legislators, and judges who charge
that it gives too much power to agencies and essentially abdicates judicial responsibility.235 To its critics, Chevron runs counter to section 706
of the APA, which states that “the reviewing court”—not the
agency—“shall decide all relevant questions of law [and] interpret . . .
statutory provisions.”236 It implies to them that whenever a statutory
ambiguity exists, the agency effectively gets to decide what the statute
means.237
Recognizing the role played by the Interstitial Steps blunts these
concerns and bolsters Chevron’s defensibility. The Interstitial Steps
call for judges to decide a series of relevant questions of law and, in so
doing, to interpret statutory provisions. Judges confront questions
they must answer at every turn. Step 1 asks a clearly relevant question
of law, as do each of the Interstitial Steps and Step 2. Each step in the
conceptual framework mapped out in Part II demands that judges engage in statutory interpretation. Not only does Step 1 call for judges to
apply all the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, but the Interstitial Steps require courts to decide whether (1) the statute presents a
major question, (2) the agency possesses authority to make binding
law, and (3) the totality of circumstances weigh for or against implying
a delegation. If the judge traverses up the Interstitial Steps to the top,
then Step 2 presents another relevant question of law—one that cannot be decided without judges engaging in statutory interpretation—
namely: Is the agency’s interpretation of a statute reasonable? The
only action that judges do not take at Step 2 is to substitute their own
best interpretation for the agency’s—but they may still hold the
agency’s interpretation unlawful if it does not fall within the realm of
interpretive reasonableness.
When judges follow the Interstitial Steps and reach the legal conclusion that Congress meant for the agency to have the discretion and
235

See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 5, at 788.

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
237 Justice Thomas, for example, argues against courts “blithely” deferring to agencies on
matters of statutory interpretation, objecting that under Chevron, “[s]tatutory ambiguity thus
becomes an implicit delegation of rule-making authority.” Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699,
2713–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
236
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authority to decide, within reason, what ambiguous language means,
they fulfill their responsibility—not only by engaging in legal analysis
but also by respecting the delegation that they conclude Congress intended to make to the agency.238 When judges ask, “How much authority has validly been allocated to this agency?” they ask, as Peter
Strauss has explained, a relevant legal question, the answer to which
“is an element of the law the court is ultimately responsible to find
and obey.”239 Chief Justice Roberts has elaborated that judges do not
abandon their duty to interpret the law “when [they] afford an
agency’s statutory interpretation Chevron deference; [they] respect it.
[They] give binding deference to permissible agency interpretations of
statutory ambiguities because Congress has delegated to the agency
the authority to interpret those ambiguities ‘with the force of law.’”240
Underneath much criticism of Chevron appears a certain understandable unease about its perceived automaticity—that is, the notion
that ambiguity seems to lead immediately and mechanistically to
agency deference. When he was a judge on the Tenth Circuit, Justice
Neil Gorsuch openly worried about what he characterized as “Chevron’s claim that legislative ambiguity represents a license to executive
agencies to render authoritative judgments about what a statute
means.”241 He argued that “Chevron suggests we should infer an intent to delegate not because Congress has anywhere expressed any
such wish, not because anyone anywhere in any legislative history
even hinted at that possibility, but because the legislation in question
is silent (ambiguous) on the subject.”242
Such unease derives, no doubt, from the way judges and scholars
too often write about Chevron, making it seem as if courts must act
238 See John F. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 HARV. L. REV. 457,
459 (2014) (noting that, although the APA calls upon courts to make legal determinations,
“judges nonetheless properly defer to” the agency under Chevron, and “the reviewing court
fulfills its duty to ‘interpret’ the statute by determining whether the agency has stayed within the
bounds of its assigned discretion—that is, whether the agency has construed its organic act
reasonably”).
239 Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012); see also Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 21 (1985) (noting that “a court’s
refusal to use independent judgment actually fulfills Congress’ intent” where “the most faithful
reading of a statute” indicates Congress intended to give the agency authority to fill in gaps or
clarify ambiguities).
240 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)).
241 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
242 Id. at 1153.
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reflexively and approve any reasonable agency interpretation upon
the mere showing of some statutory ambiguity.243 King provides one
of numerous examples. In that case, the majority declared that Chevron deference “is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill
in the statutory gaps.”244 But does ambiguity truly “constitute” a delegation? Hardly. Ambiguity merely creates the space within which an
agency might be allowed to decide how to choose among different
reasonable meanings. The existence of such space only constitutes a
necessary—not a sufficient—condition to support a judicial finding of
delegation to the agency. Cass Sunstein had it exactly right when he
wrote that “it would be a major error to treat all ambiguities as delegations.”245 The Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Oregon246 was correct
too in explaining that “Chevron deference . . . is not accorded merely
because the statute is ambiguous and an administrative official is involved.”247 More must be shown. That “more” comes from the Interstitial Steps.
Chevron’s Interstitial Steps offer a response to the not unreasonable concern that courts may approach deference in much too cavalier
a fashion. That was the concern Chief Justice Roberts expressed in his
dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC248:
A court should not defer to an agency until the court decides,
on its own, that the agency is entitled to deference. Courts
defer to an agency’s interpretation of law when and because
Congress has conferred on the agency interpretive authority
over the question at issue. An agency cannot exercise interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether an
agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court,
without deference to the agency.
....
. . . [B]efore a court may grant such deference, it must
on its own decide whether Congress—the branch vested with
lawmaking authority under the Constitution—has in fact delegated to the agency lawmaking power over the ambiguity at
243 See, e.g., Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 211, at 611 (stating that Chevron deference
“rests squarely on the question of statutory ambiguity”); see also supra note 53.
244 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
245 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2090 (1990).
246 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
247 Id. at 258.
248 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
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issue. . . . Whether Congress has conferred such power is the
“relevant question[] of law” that must be answered before
affording Chevron deference.249
Chief Justice Roberts described well the rationale supporting the Interstitial Steps that the Court has explained judges must traverse
before they reach Chevron Step 2. He may well have lost the better of
the argument to Justice Scalia on the more legally salient issues raised
in City of Arlington, but his account of courts’ responsibility to make
an independent judgment about deference’s justification provides an
excellent account of the rationale for Chevron’s Interstitial Steps. Perhaps if the Court and the Congress—and the scholarly community—
more openly recognized these Interstitial Steps, critics would be less
quick to treat Chevron as a doctrine in need of retirement.
CONCLUSION
This Foreword has brought into sharper focus the Interstitial
Steps that lie between Chevron’s Step 1 and Step 2. Recognizing these
steps mitigates the concern that Chevron automatically substitutes
agency interpretation for judicial judgment whenever a statute governing that agency is ambiguous. A mere finding of statutory ambiguity does not ineluctably justify deference to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation. The Interstitial Steps provide the legal framework for
determining when deference is justified: only when Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated interpretive authority to the agency.
Rather than seeing Chevron as directing courts to retreat from
deciding the relevant legal questions, the Interstitial Steps reveal what
those relevant questions are, and they show the work that judges must
undertake in cases involving agency interpretations of statutes. If the
judicial analysis of the Interstitial Steps supports an implied delegation of authority to an agency, courts respect the law not by rejecting
Chevron deference but by deferring to the agency’s reasonable interpretation. If a court’s analysis of those steps does not support implying
a delegation, then the court must provide its own best interpretation
of the disputed statutory provision. Either way, judges are involved
throughout the entire conceptual process and can hardly be said to
have abdicated their role to decide legal questions and to uphold the
rule of law.
249

§ 706).

Id. at 1877–80 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (last alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
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Alternative accounts of Chevron that collapse its steps or that insert an antecedent step before Step 1 only foster confusion about the
meaning and value of Chevron’s multistep framework. Step 1 should
not be overlooked, pushed aside, or even hinted to be optional, for it
is essential under any conception of the rule of law. After Step 1, the
Interstitial Steps provide the legal basis for concluding that Congress
has delegated to an agency the administrative authority to define and
interpret statutory terms. Step 2 instructs courts to respect that delegation of authority but also to ensure that it remains cabined by a
principle of interpretive reasonableness. Although the framework
presented here—Step 1, Interstitial Steps, Step 2—departs from how
those who study administrative law have tended to conceive the Chevron framework in the past, it not only captures better the internal
logic of Chevron and its progeny but it offers a more defensible foundation for preserving a decision central to American administrative
law.

